

SEE Check regional poll: Disinformation narratives and perception of fact-checking newsrooms

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Introduction

This report presents the findings of a regional public opinion survey conducted in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia. The study examines the prevalence of selected disinformation narratives and conspiracy beliefs, attitudes toward key geopolitical issues, information and verification habits, and public perceptions of fact-checking organizations in the region.

The analysis focuses not only on the level of acceptance of individual narratives, but also on broader patterns of regional consensus, polarization, and demographic variation. The report is organized into four thematic sections: conspiratorial and disinformation narratives; geopolitical attitudes related to the European Union, Russia, and the war in Ukraine; online information sources and verification practices; and public familiarity with and perceptions of SEE Check member organizations active in the four countries.

Methodology

Research design

The survey aimed to measure the impact of disinformation and disinformation narratives on citizens' perceptions and attitudes in four countries of the region (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia), in order to provide an evidence base for developing effective countermeasures and supporting more resilient, better-informed societies.

The survey consisted of 12 questions, organized into four thematic categories designed to assess exposure and vulnerability to disinformation, the influence of disinformation narratives on political attitudes, information habits, and perception of fact-checking organizations

Agreement with conspiratorial claims and disinformation narratives

In the first two categories, respondents were presented with a series of statements and asked to indicate their level of agreement. In the first category, respondents were read five prominent conspiratorial claims regarding migration, climate change, "depopulation", secret global elites, and vaccine safety (Questions 1–5). Responses were measured on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (completely agree) to 4 (completely disagree). A "Don't know / Refuses to answer" option was available but not actively prompted. The tested statements were, as follows:

- Migrants from African and Asian countries are part of a plan to change the ethnic structure of the destination countries
- Climate change is not real, it is fabricated by political elites and the media they control
- Global elites want to reduce the world population
- A small group of powerful people is responsible for all major world events, such as wars, protests and government changes

- Vaccines are more dangerous than beneficial

Agreement with narratives on (geo)political topics

The second category assessed political views likely influenced by active disinformation campaigns and narratives previously observed in the region, related to the EU and Russia's invasion of Ukraine (Questions 6–9). For Q6-Q8, the same 4-point agreement scale was used as in Category 1. Question 9 regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine was a special case, with a distinct justification scale where respondents rated the extent to which they considered Russia's actions justified, using a scale from "completely justified" to "completely unjustified". The tested statements were, as follows:

- By sanctioning Russia, the EU has ended up weakening itself
- EU integration will threaten traditional family values
- EU is increasingly censoring free speech
- To what extent do you think Russia's armed actions in Ukraine are justified or unjustified?

Information and verification habits

The third segment evaluated the respondents' habits in consuming information on social media platforms, using two multiple-choice formats: Question 10 was a multiple-choice item tracking which social media and messaging platforms (e.g., Facebook, Telegram, WhatsApp, TikTok) respondents access for news at least once a week and allowed them to check all answers that applied. Question 11 was a frequency-based scale, tracking how often respondents verify online news accuracy before sharing it, ranging from "Always" to "Never".

Perception of fact-checkers' work

The fourth section examines attitudes toward fact-checking. Question 12 was tailored to rate specific members of the South East Europe Check (SEE Check) network active in the respondent's respective country: Faktoje in Albania; Raskrinkavanje.ba in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Raskrinkavanje.me in Montenegro; and two network members, FakeNews Tragač and Raskrikavanje - in Serbia. This question asked respondents to evaluate the quality of content produced by the local fact-checker(s) using a 5-point scale ranging from "Very good" to "Very bad", with an additional "Don't know / haven't heard" option.

Selection of tested statements

The statements used in this research are drawn from disinformation narratives documented in the everyday work of fact-checkers across the regional SEE Check network. The selection of statements was guided by the following key criteria: the presence of their respective narratives in the information environment of each country covered by this research; the tendency to spread widely, re-emerge, and/or persist over time; and addressing topics of public interest with the potential to reach broad audiences and influence attitudes and behavior.

The narratives were identified through evidence-based selection and expert consultation, drawing on three main types of sources. First, the annual country and regional reports on disinformation produced by SEE Check members, which document major narratives, actors, tactics, and developments observed within individual national information ecosystems, as well as broader cross-border patterns and trends across the region. Second, a wider body of fact-checking, research, and analytical work published by network members over the years was also consulted. The preliminary list of selected statements was then reviewed through consultations with SEE Check members during the drafting and preparation of the survey questionnaire, ensuring that the final selection reflects both the documented frequency of these narratives in the regional disinformation landscape and the expert judgment of fact-checkers based on their direct experience.

The statements themselves were formulated in a manner that synthesizes the main narrative elements and functions as a signal that is easy to decode, increasing the likelihood that diverse demographic groups will recognize the underlying narratives each statement represents.

Data collection

Fieldwork was conducted by Ipsos agency between 15 and 31 December 2025, using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI), on representative samples of the general adult population (18+) in each country. Around 1,000 interviews were completed per country based on a dual-frame landline and mobile database. A combined quota and stratified sampling approach was applied, with quotas on age and gender and stratification by region and type of settlement (urban/rural), ensuring that the achieved sample structure closely matched the population in each country.

The questionnaire was developed by the SEE Check network and adapted by the polling agency. The original questions were developed in English and then adapted and translated into four local language versions (Albanian variant for Albania and BCSM variants for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia), with minor country-specific adjustments in wording and response options. Translations were reviewed and, where necessary, back-checked by native speakers with survey-research experience to ensure clarity, cultural appropriateness and consistency across languages.

The average interview duration was approximately five minutes. Following data collection, the datasets were cleaned, harmonised across countries, weighted via country-specific rim-weighting procedures, anonymised, and merged into a single integrated SPSS database in English, providing a robust and comparable empirical basis for analysing attitudes toward disinformation in all four countries.

Research sample

The research was conducted on a survey sample of 4,071 respondents drawn near-evenly from four countries: Albania (1048), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1008), Montenegro (1005), and Serbia (1010). The average age of respondents was 49.9 years overall, with some variation across countries: 52.04 in Albania, 45.91 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 49.29 in Montenegro, and 52.28 in Serbia.

Table 1: Research sample by country		
Country	Number of participants	Average age
Albania	1048 (25.7%)	52.04
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1008 (24.8%)	45.91
Montenegro	1005 (24.7%)	49.29
Serbia	1010 (24.8%)	52.28
Total	4071 (100%)	49.9

The overall sample was slightly male-skewed, with **52.5%** men and **47.5%** women participating in the poll. This difference was heavily influenced by the Albanian sample, where a considerable discrepancy between female (**41.40%**) and male participants (**58.60%**) was present.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina the gender ratio was almost exactly the same as the regional average, while in the other two countries, Montenegro and Serbia, the percentage of female participants was slightly higher than that of male participants.

Table 2: Gender distribution by country					
Gender	Albania	BiH	Montenegro	Serbia	Total
Female	41.40%	47.30%	50.50%	50.80%	47.50%
Male	58.60%	52.70%	49.50%	49.20%	52.50%

In terms of settlement type, the sample was predominantly urban, with **61.2%** of respondents living in urban areas and **38.8%** in rural areas. The sample varies considerably across countries, with share of the urban population spanning from **45.60%** in BiH to **72.50%** in Montenegro.

Table 3: Settlement type distribution by country

Settlement	Albania	BiH	Montenegro	Serbia	Total
Urban	63.70%	45.60%	72.50%	62.80%	61.20%
Rural	36.30%	54.40%	27.50%	37.20%	38.80%

In the overall sample and each country individually, vocational/high school is the most common education level among the survey participants (**47.80%**) while master/PhD is the least common (**5.30%**). Overall, the sample is weighted toward middle education levels rather than the highest degree categories, but the balance of education levels varies significantly across the countries.

Albania has the highest share of both elementary school (**23.10%**) and Master/PhD respondents (**9.20%**). In both categories, the difference is considerable, especially the percentage of elementary school education - more than double the share recorded in Serbia, which has the second highest share of respondents in this category. Montenegro has the highest share of bachelor/college respondents (**45.40%**), significantly higher than other countries, including Serbia which is second highest with **34.70%**. Bosnia and Herzegovina has the largest share of vocational/high school respondents (**54.70%**), but with a smaller margin compared to other countries than in the previous two cases.

Education level	Albania	BiH	Montenegro	Serbia	Total
Elementary school	23.10%	9.50%	7.10%	10.80%	12.70%
Vocational/High school	41.70%	54.70%	47.60%	47.60%	47.80%
Bachelor/College	26%	30.80%	45.40%	34.70%	34.10%
Master/PhD	9.20%	5.10%	0%	6.90%	5.30%

Survey results

Conspiratorial claims and disinformation narratives

Three out of four tested statements received more than **50%** agreement in all four countries. The highest level and intensity of agreement is recorded for the claim that major world events are controlled by a small group of powerful actors, while the strongest and most intense rejection is observed for climate change denial.

Table 5: Conspiratorial claims: regional overview

Statement	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know
A small group of powerful people is responsible for all major world events, such as wars, protests and government changes.	74.80%	18.76%	56.04%	22.23%	6.00%	16.23%	2.98%
Global elites want to reduce the world population.	60.62%	21.18%	39.43%	34.04%	9.75%	24.29%	5.34%
Vaccines are more dangerous than beneficial.	53.15%	20.08%	33.07%	42.74%	12.38%	30.36%	4.11%
Migrants from African and Asian countries are a part of a plan to change the ethnic structure of the destination countries.	50.60%	21.28%	29.32%	41.89%	11.49%	30.41%	7.50%
Climate change is not real, it is fabricated by political elites and the media they control.	38.08%	17.48%	20.60%	57.50%	10.89%	46.61%	4.42%

Global elite conspiracies

Tested claim: *A small group of powerful people is responsible for all major world events, such as wars, protests and government changes*

Background: This statement is emblematic of a conspiratorial metanarrative that frames world affairs as the product of global-scale conspiracies by hidden elites and secret networks commonly present in claims about a secret "world government", "New World Order", the "Great Reset", QAnon-style "cabals" and similar. Multiple narratives within this framework focus on erosion of national sovereignty and alleged threats to individual freedoms by covert control of figures or institutions that are seen as representatives of the alleged nefarious elite conspiracy, including Bill Gates, Klaus Schwab, George Soros, the Rothschild family, the World Economic Forum, the United Nations, the European Union and, particularly during the Covid-19 pandemic, the World Health Organization. Statements like this capture the structural logic of conspiratorial thinking: the assumption that nothing happens by accident, that powerful hidden actors operate behind the scenes, and that a single group is responsible for events as diverse as armed conflicts, civil unrest and election outcomes. Versions of this statement are therefore commonly used in psychometric scales that measure general tendency to interpret events as the product of secret, coordinated manipulation (conspiracist ideation).

Results: This statement records the highest level of agreement among all tested claims. Overall, **74.8%** of respondents across the four countries agree with the statement, **22.2%** disagree and only **3.0%** are undecided. More than half of all respondents (**56.0%**) express

complete agreement, making this not only the most widely accepted claim, but also the one that generates the strongest intensity of support.

Table 6: A small group of powerful people is responsible for all major world events: country breakdown

Country	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know
ALB	70.80%	13.26%	57.54%	26.15%	2.96%	23.19%	3.05%
BiH	79.96%	22.72%	57.24%	18.35%	7.64%	10.71%	1.69%
MNE	77.19%	20.52%	56.67%	19.72%	5.28%	14.44%	3.09%
SRB	71.40%	18.77%	52.63%	24.53%	8.24%	16.29%	4.07%
Regional average	74.80%	18.76%	56.04%	22.23%	6.00%	16.23%	2.98%

Agreement exceeds **70%** in all four countries, ranging from **70.8%** in Albania to **80.0%** in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Montenegro follows with **77.2%**, while Serbia records **71.4%**. The difference between the highest and lowest levels of agreement amounts to approximately **nine percentage points**, making this one of the most internally consistent attitudes across the region. Bosnia and Herzegovina displays the highest overall agreement, while Albania records the highest level of complete disagreement.

Men and women differ only marginally in their attitudes. Men are somewhat more likely to agree with the statement (**76.1%**) than women (**73.4%**), while levels of disagreement differ by just over two percentage points. Overall, gender differences are considerably smaller than differences observed between countries.

Table 7: A small group of powerful people is responsible for all major world events: gender breakdown

Gender	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know
Men	76.09%	16.24%	59.85%	21.20%	5.52%	15.68%	2.71%
Women	73.36%	21.55%	51.81%	23.37%	6.53%	16.84%	3.26%
Total	74.80%	18.76%	56.04%	22.23%	6.00%	16.23%	2.98%

Depopulation

Tested claim: *Global elites want to reduce the world population*

Background:

The “depopulation” narrative is a conspiracy framework claiming that powerful global actors are intentionally trying to reduce the world’s population through coordinated political, medical,

environmental, or technological means. Various actors and institutions - governments, international organizations, pharmaceutical companies, economic elites - have been accused of secretly pursuing population reduction. Globally recognized and influential individuals have also been frequent targets of such narratives, usually, but not only, when making statements related to the world population that would be taken out of context and presented as “evidence” that there is a secret plan to lower the number of people on the planet. These narratives often overlap with other conspiratorial narratives, like climate change denial or antivaccination narratives, presenting their main topics - like vaccines, or green policies - as tools of “depopulation”. The narrative is highly adaptive, often absorbing unrelated events and presenting them as evidence of the plan to “depopulate” the Earth - especially global crises such as pandemics, wars, and economic instability.

Results: Agreement with this claim is lower than for the previous statement, but it nevertheless has support from a clear majority of respondents. Across the four countries, **60.6%** agree with the statement, while **34.0%** disagree and **5.3%** remain undecided. Nearly four out of ten respondents (**39.4%**) completely agree with the claim.

Table 8: Global elites want to reduce the world population: country breakdown

Country	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know
ALB	57.78%	15.38%	42.41%	38.20%	2.58%	35.63%	4.01%
BiH	64.41%	26.92%	37.49%	31.51%	13.16%	18.34%	4.09%
MNE	61.06%	22.61%	38.45%	32.27%	10.46%	21.81%	6.67%
SRB	59.34%	20.08%	39.26%	34.00%	13.12%	20.87%	6.66%
Regional average	60.62%	21.18%	39.43%	34.04%	9.75%	24.29%	5.34%

Country-level differences are relatively modest. Agreement ranges from **57.8%** in Albania to **64.4%** in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a gap of approximately **6.6 percentage points**. Montenegro and Serbia occupy intermediate positions, with **61.1%** and **59.3%** agreement respectively. Overall, attitudes toward this claim display a high degree of cross-country coherence, with all four countries clustering around the regional average.

Although Albania records the lowest overall agreement, it also displays the highest proportion of respondents expressing complete agreement. At the same time, Albania records the highest share of complete disagreement, suggesting greater polarization and stronger intensity of opinion than in the other countries.

Gender differences are again limited. Overall agreement is almost identical among men and women, standing at **60.9%** and **60.3%**, respectively. Men, however, are more likely to express complete agreement (**42.9%** compared with **35.6%** among women), while women are slightly more likely to be undecided. As with the previous statement, gender differences remain substantially smaller than country-level differences.

Table 9: Global elites want to reduce the world population: gender breakdown							
Gender	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know
Men	60.90%	18.00%	42.90%	34.74%	9.33%	25.41%	4.36%
Women	60.30%	24.70%	35.60%	33.26%	10.22%	23.04%	6.43%
Total	60.61%	21.18%	39.43%	34.04%	9.75%	24.29%	5.34%

Antivaccination

Tested claim: *Vaccines are more dangerous than beneficial.*

Background: Fact-checkers in the region consistently identify antivaccination content as one of the most widespread and persistent types of disinformation, especially after the surge of viral falsehoods targeting Covid-19 vaccines. Such narratives connect to a wider anti-science worldview that discredits evidence-based medicine and promotes pseudoscientific cures over medication produced by pharmaceutical companies (“Big Pharma” conspiracy theories) and often merge with conspiracy theories about global elites and depopulation.

The focus of these narratives shifts to different vaccines over time, depending on public health developments, media attention and specific vaccination campaigns. The earliest recorded claims mostly targeted the MMR vaccine; the Covid-19 pandemic brought a wave of disinformation about those using mRNA technology and, more recently, attention is increasingly turned to the HPV vaccine, especially as some countries in the region consider including it in mandatory immunization schedules.

The antivaccination metanarrative also contains a multitude of long-running narratives about vaccines causing autism, infertility, cancer, immune damage or death, altering DNA, serving depopulation goals, or are part of a broader system of political and technological control. What remains constant across these variations is that their health benefits are denied and their risks fabricated or grossly exaggerated. The underlying false claim of all antivaccination narratives, that vaccines do more harm than good - i.e. that they are more dangerous than beneficial - was therefore selected for this survey, as it captures the essence of the antivaccination metanarrative.

Results: Public opinion on vaccine safety is considerably more divided than on the two previous claims. Overall, **53.2%** of respondents across the four countries agree that vaccines are more dangerous than beneficial, while **42.7%** disagree and **4.1%** are undecided. Approximately one-third of respondents (**33.1%**) express complete agreement with the statement, while **30.4%** completely reject it.

Table 10: Vaccines are more dangerous than beneficial: country breakdown							
Country	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know
ALB	59.59%	14.80%	44.79%	36.02%	6.69%	29.32%	4.39%
BiH	52.89%	24.10%	28.78%	43.92%	14.14%	29.78%	3.19%
MNE	54.13%	22.29%	31.84%	41.79%	12.44%	29.35%	4.08%
SRB	45.73%	19.35%	26.39%	49.50%	16.47%	33.04%	4.76%
Regional average	53.15%	20.08%	33.07%	42.74%	12.38%	30.36%	4.11%

Country-level differences are more pronounced than for the previous claims. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro record the highest levels of agreement, at **52.9%** and **54.1%**, respectively, while Serbia stands apart as the only country in which disagreement exceeds agreement. In Serbia, **49.5%** disagree with the statement, compared with **45.7%** who agree. Albania occupies an intermediate position, although agreement remains above **50%**. The difference between the highest and lowest levels of agreement amounts to approximately eight percentage points, suggesting a moderate degree of cross-country variation.

Unlike the previous claims, no country exhibits overwhelming consensus. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro display broadly similar patterns, while Serbia is distinguished by comparatively lower levels of agreement and the highest share of complete disagreement. Overall, attitudes toward vaccine safety appear considerably more contested than beliefs related to global elites.

Gender differences are limited. Men are slightly more likely to agree with the statement (**54.0%**) than women (**52.2%**), while women are somewhat more likely to disagree. Levels of uncertainty are low among both groups, although women are marginally more likely to answer "Don't know". Overall, differences between men and women remain considerably smaller than differences observed between countries.

Table 11: Vaccines are more dangerous than beneficial: gender breakdown							
Gender	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know
Men	53.98%	19.87%	34.11%	41.62%	11.86%	29.76%	4.40%
Women	52.23%	20.31%	31.92%	43.99%	12.95%	31.04%	3.78%
Total	53.15%	20.08%	33.07%	42.74%	12.38%	30.36%	4.11%

Antimigration conspiracies

Tested claim: *Migrants from African and Asian countries are part of a plan to change the ethnic structure of the destination countries*

Background:

Antimigration conspiracies in the region blend imported far-right tropes from racist theories such as the “Great Replacement” and “white genocide” with locally generated xenophobic, racist, and Islamophobic claims. They typically target migrants from the MENA region by depicting them as security threats in countries of arrival or transit, or as instruments of an “anti-white” project designed to weaken Europe by “replacing” white and Christian populations with people of other ethnicities and religions. Antimigrant fearmongering is frequently fused with broader anti-EU or anti-liberal rhetoric. In localized variants, migrants and refugees are portrayed as being “brought in” by domestic political actors who allegedly plan to fast-track their citizenship in order to expand their voter base or to displace specific ethnic groups from certain territories. In some cases, these narratives place particular emphasis on supposed privileges granted to migrants and refugees over local citizens, fabricating claims about generous cash benefits, free housing, and similar advantages.

Results: Agreement with this claim is evenly balanced against disagreement. Across the region, **50.6%** of respondents agree with the statement, while **41.9%** disagree and **7.5%** are undecided. Compared with other claims examined in the survey, this narrative occupies the middle of the acceptance scale and generates relatively high levels of disagreement.

Country	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know
ALB	45.99%	17.46%	28.53%	47.23%	4.87%	42.37%	6.77%
BiH	50.45%	25.77%	24.68%	41.29%	14.73%	26.57%	8.26%
MNE	52.39%	22.31%	30.08%	40.74%	12.75%	27.99%	6.87%
SRB	53.77%	19.74%	34.03%	38.10%	13.89%	24.21%	8.13%
Regional average	50.60%	21.28%	29.32%	41.89%	11.49%	30.41%	7.50%

Serbia records the highest level of agreement, with **53.8%** of respondents supporting the statement, followed closely by Montenegro (**52.4%**) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (**50.5%**). Albania stands apart as the only country where agreement remains below **50%**, with **46.0%** agreeing and **47.2%** disagreeing. Albania also records by far the highest level of complete disagreement, indicating stronger rejection of the statement than elsewhere in the region.

Despite these differences, the overall gap between the highest and lowest levels of agreement amounts to less than eight percentage points, indicating a moderate degree of cross-country consistency. Bosnia and Herzegovina lies closest to the regional average and displays response patterns similar to those observed across the region as a whole.

Gender differences are relatively small. Men are slightly more likely than women to both agree and disagree with the statement, while women are considerably more likely to remain undecided. This pattern suggests somewhat lower levels of certainty among female respondents, although overall differences between men and women remain limited.

Table 14: Climate change is not real, but is fabricated by political elites and the media they control: country breakdown

Gender	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know
Men	51.10%	18.41%	32.69%	43.09%	10.68%	32.41%	5.81%
Women	50.06%	24.46%	25.60%	40.57%	12.38%	28.19%	9.38%
Total	50.60%	21.28%	29.32%	41.90%	11.49%	30.41%	7.50%

Climate change denial

Tested claim: *Climate change is not real, it is fabricated by political elites and the media they control*

Background: Climate change denial in the region is a relatively new disinformation trend that has gained considerable momentum over the past couple of years. It appears as a broader set of claims that minimize human responsibility, distort climate science, or reinterpret extreme weather as the result of hidden manipulation rather than environmental change. These narratives frequently borrow elements of other conspiracy theories and/or blame various fictional or misrepresented technologies (HAARP, “chemtrails”, “tectonic weapons”, directed-energy weapons and similar) for catastrophic events like floods, fires, storms, droughts and earthquakes. While extreme weather events are typically not denied but interpreted through “alternative” explanations of their causes, scientific warnings about the risks and consequences of climate change are dismissed altogether in these narratives. Consequently, climate policies designed to protect the environment are portrayed as a cover for authoritarian projects (aimed at controlling populations and imposing a new social order through restrictions on movement, property, diet, etc) while media reports on climate change are presented as alarmist “green propaganda”. These are the “layers” of climate change denial represented in the statement selected for this research.

Results: Rejection of climate change denial is one of the most geographically consistent findings in the survey. Among all claims tested in the survey, this statement receives the lowest level of support and the strongest rejection.

Table 14: Climate change is not real, but is fabricated by political elites and the media they control: country breakdown

Country	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know
ALB	39.79 %	15.08 %	24.71 %	56.11 %	4.20 %	51.91 %	4.10 %
BiH	40.71 %	20.26 %	20.46 %	56.11 %	15.09 %	41.01 %	3.18 %
MNE	35.12 %	17.61 %	17.51 %	59.90 %	9.45 %	50.45 %	4.98 %
SRB	36.61 %	17.06 %	19.54 %	57.94 %	15.08 %	42.86 %	5.46 %
Regional average	38.08%	17.48%	20.60%	57.50%	10.89%	46.61%	4.42%

Agreement ranges from **35.1%** in Montenegro to **40.7%** in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a gap of only **5.6 percentage points**. Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina record the highest levels of agreement, at **39.8%** and **40.7%**, respectively, while Serbia and Montenegro show somewhat lower levels of support.

Overall, only **38.1%** of respondents agree with the statement, while **57.5%** disagree and **4.4%** are undecided. Nearly half of all respondents (**46.6%**) completely reject the claim, making it the least accepted narrative examined in the survey. This is the only statement in this group for which disagreement exceeds agreement in every country, and the only claim rejected by an absolute majority of respondents.

Gender differences are modest but noticeable. Women are more likely to reject the claim, with **59.6%** disagreeing overall compared with **55.6%** of men. Men are more likely to agree (**40.4%** vs. **35.5%** of women) and to completely agree (**23.72%** vs. **17.14%** of women) with the statement. Despite these differences, majorities of both men and women reject the statement, reinforcing the finding that climate change denial is the least widely accepted and least persuasive narrative examined in the survey.

Table 15: Climate change is not real, but is fabricated by political elites and the media they control: gender breakdown

Gender	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know
Men	40.43%	16.71%	23.72%	55.59%	11.14%	44.45%	3.98%
Women	35.47%	18.33%	17.14%	59.61%	10.62%	48.99%	4.92%
Total	38.08%	17.48%	20.60%	57.50%	10.89%	46.61%	4.42%

Political claims and disinformation narratives

Three out of four tested statements, specifically those conveying narratives about the EU, received more than **50%** agreement in all four countries, but the percentages are generally lower compared to conspiratorial statements in the previous section. The highest level and intensity of agreement is recorded for the claim that EU sanctions against Russia have backfired, while the lowest support is expressed for justification of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The first three statements find more congruent support across the region, while attitudes toward Russia's actions in Ukraine are more polarized and more strongly shaped by country context.

Table 16: Political narratives: regional overview

Country	Agree	Somewh at agree	Complete ly agree	Disagree	Somewh at disagree	Complete ly disagree	Don't know
By sanctioning Russia, the EU has ended up weakening itself	60.82%	22.06%	38.76%	29.28%	8.92%	20.35%	9.91%
EU is increasingly censoring free speech	53.58%	22.80%	30.77%	40.44%	11.83%	28.61%	5.98%
EU integration will threaten traditional family values	50.12%	20.45%	29.67%	46.14%	11.46%	34.69%	3.74%
To what extent do you think Russia's armed actions in Ukraine are justified or unjustified?	38.55%	22.75%	15.79%	53.46%	10.96%	42.50%	8.00%

Sanctions against Russia

Tested claim: *By sanctioning Russia, the EU has ended up weakening itself*

Background: This narrative argues that sanctions on Russia have backfired, inflicting greater damage on European economies, societies, and political stability than on Russia itself. It is commonly paired with claims that Europe is economically collapsing, that its citizens reject sanctions, that governments are acting against their own national interests, and that Russia has remained resilient or even strengthened under pressure. In regional disinformation ecosystems, this narrative often serves a dual purpose: legitimizing Russian policy and reinforcing broader anti-EU claims about weakness, hypocrisy, and strategic self-harm on the part of Europe.

Results: The claim that by sanctioning Russia, the EU has ended up weakening itself receives majority support across the region. Overall, **60.8%** of respondents agree with the statement, while **29.3%** disagree and **9.9%** are undecided. The intensity of agreement is also notable: **38.8%** completely agree with the claim, compared with **20.4%** who completely disagree.

Agreement is highest in Serbia (**66.2%**), followed by Montenegro (**64.5%**) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (**62.3%**). Albania records the lowest level of agreement, at **50.8%**, but even there a narrow majority supports the claim. The gap between the highest and lowest agreement levels is **15.4 percentage points**, indicating moderate cross-country divergence. The results suggest that the narrative of EU self-harm through sanctions resonates across all four countries, but it is particularly strong in Serbia and Montenegro.

Country	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know
ALB	50.76%	18.89%	31.87%	38.84%	3.82%	35.02%	10.40%
BiH	62.28%	28.54%	33.73%	27.05%	13.37%	13.67%	10.68%
MNE	64.47%	21.86%	42.61%	26.75%	7.88%	18.86%	8.78%
SRB	66.20%	19.09%	47.12%	24.06%	10.83%	13.22%	9.74%
Regional average	60.82%	22.06%	38.76%	29.28%	8.92%	20.35%	9.91%

Albania stands apart because disagreement is considerably higher there than elsewhere, with **38.8%** rejecting the statement, of whom **35.0%** express complete disagreement. By contrast, Serbia combines the highest overall agreement with the highest level of complete agreement (**47.1%**), suggesting stronger intensity of conviction. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a majority in all parts of the country share the perception that sanctions have harmed the EU itself, making this one of the most broadly shared attitudes captured in the survey. Agreement is strongest in RS (**73.0%**), followed by Brčko District (**60.9%**) and FBiH (**56.3%**).

Gender differences are visible but not large. Men are more likely to agree with the statement than women (**63.3%** compared with **58.0%**) and are substantially more likely to completely agree (**44.7%** compared with **32.2%**). Women are more likely to be undecided, with **13.1%** selecting “Don't know”, compared with **7.0%** of men.

Gender	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know
Men	63.34%	18.68%	44.66%	29.64%	7.40%	22.24%	7.02%
Women	58.02%	25.81%	32.21%	28.87%	10.61%	18.26%	13.11%
Total	60.82%	22.06%	38.76%	29.27%	8.92%	20.35%	9.91%

EU and traditional values

Tested claim: *EU integration will threaten traditional family values*

Background: Narratives that portray the European Union as an authoritarian force aiming to impose cultural change on candidate countries tap into broader cultural anxieties about the loss of traditional values, presenting the EU as a civilizational threat to the “traditional family,” children’s wellbeing, parental rights, religion, and national identity. They frequently overlap with anti-LGBTIQ and anti-gender disinformation, claiming that the EU is imposing “gender ideology” forcing schools and parents to accept values allegedly hostile to religion or family life, and punishing states that resist. These narratives are often explicitly used to advocate against EU membership, particularly by right-wing and nationalist political actors, pundits, and influencers, but they also circulate in less explicit forms as “shocking news” that sometimes goes viral on social networks.

Results: The agreement that EU integration will threaten traditional family values is more evenly balanced than with the sanctions narrative, though agreement still slightly outweighs disagreement. At the regional level, **50.12%** of respondents agree with the statement, while **46.14%** disagree, but this balance is largely shaped by Albania’s strong rejection of the claim, which offsets majority agreement in BiH, Montenegro, and Serbia. This makes the narrative one of the more contested in the dataset.

Country	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don’t know
ALB	37.12%	13.17%	23.95%	60.88%	5.44%	55.44%	2.00%
BiH	55.86%	24.85%	31.01%	40.36%	15.41%	24.95%	3.78%
MNE	52.64%	22.59%	30.05%	43.48%	11.84%	31.64%	3.88%
SRB	55.40%	21.51%	33.89%	39.25%	13.38%	25.87%	5.35%
Regional average	50.12%	20.45%	29.67%	46.14%	11.46%	34.69%	3.74%

In Albania, the only country where disagreement strongly outweighs agreement, **60.88% disagree** that EU integration threatens traditional family values, while **37.12% agree**. Intensity of disagreement is also high, with **55.44% of respondents who completely disagree** with the statement.

Agreement is highest in **Bosnia and Herzegovina (55.86%)**, with the majority agreement highly influenced by responses from Republika Srpska, where **67%** agree with the statement. While opinion is almost evenly divided in FBiH (**49.8%** agree and **47.1%** disagree) and Brčko District (**47.8%** agree, **43.5%** disagree), neither demonstrates the majority agreement observed in RS.

The difference between RS and FBiH amounts to **17.2 percentage points** - the second highest in this group of tested claims.

The second highest agreement is in **Serbia (55.40%)**, followed by **Montenegro (52.64%)**. In all three countries, agreement exceeds disagreement, indicating that the narrative has majority support across much of the region. Serbia shows the strongest intensity of agreement, with **33.89% completely agreeing**, followed by BiH (**31.01%**) and Montenegro (**30.05%**). However, disagreement remains substantial in all three countries, ranging from **39.25% in Serbia** to **43.48% in Montenegro**, showing that the issue remains contested rather than consensual.

The gender breakdown shows a minor difference. Men are somewhat more likely to agree (**51.92%**) than women (**48.13%**), especially at the level of complete agreement. Women are almost evenly split between agreement and disagreement and are slightly more likely to answer don't know.

Gender	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know
Men	51.92%	19.36%	32.55%	45.60%	9.49%	36.11%	2.48%
Women	48.13%	21.66%	26.48%	46.74%	13.63%	33.11%	5.13%
Total	50.12%	20.45%	29.67%	46.14%	11.46%	34.69%	3.74%

EU and censorship

Tested claim: *EU is increasingly censoring free speech*

Background: This narrative portrays the European Union as an authoritarian force seeking to police speech, suppress dissent and impose a liberal political agenda on member states and candidate countries. It often overlaps with broader claims that the EU is hostile to family, tradition, religion or national sovereignty, and resembles the US-influenced right-wing trope of a “woke dictatorship” suppressing conservative or right-wing views. In local versions, this sometimes translates as alleged targeting of specific countries or ethnic groups.

Digital regulation in the EU, and the Digital Services Act in particular, have become frequent targets of this narrative which presents them as intended to control speech and information flows across Europe and in candidate countries. Fact-checking and other efforts to improve information integrity, are frequently folded into the same framework.

Results: The claim that the EU is increasingly censoring free speech receives majority support at the regional level, though the issue is more contested than the sanctions narrative. Overall, **53.6%** agree, while **40.4%** disagree and **6.0%** are undecided. Country-level differences are substantial.

Bosnia and Herzegovina records the highest level of agreement (**61.8%**), followed by Serbia (**59.2%**) and Montenegro (**55.8%**). In BiH, agreement ranges from **47.8%** in Brčko District to

58.9% in FBiH and **67.7%** in RS. The gap between RS and FBiH is **8.8 percentage points**, making this the most consistent finding in the survey between the two entities.

Albania is once again the only country where a majority disagrees with the statement, with only **38.1%** agreeing and **57.9%** disagreeing. The gap between the highest and lowest agreement levels is **23.7 percentage points**, making this one of the more regionally divergent issues in the dataset.

Country	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know
ALB	38.11%	12.61%	25.50%	57.88%	4.97%	52.91%	4.01%
BiH	61.77%	29.39%	32.37%	31.88%	14.70%	17.18%	6.36%
MNE	55.83%	25.52%	30.31%	37.29%	14.76%	22.53%	6.88%
SRB	59.23%	24.11%	35.12%	34.03%	13.19%	20.83%	6.75%
Regional average	53.58%	22.80%	30.77%	40.44%	11.83%	28.61%	5.98%

Gender differences are moderate but consistent with patterns seen in other narratives. Men are slightly more likely to agree than women (**54.7%** compared with **52.3%**) and more likely to completely agree (**34.0%** compared with **27.2%**). Women are more likely to select “Don’t know” (**7.6%** compared with **4.5%** of men).

Gender	Agree	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know
Men	54.70%	20.68%	34.02%	40.76%	10.48%	30.28%	4.54%
Women	52.34%	25.16%	27.18%	40.09%	13.33%	26.76%	7.57%
Total	53.58%	22.80%	30.77%	40.44%	11.83%	28.61%	5.98%

Justifications for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Question: *To what extent do you think Russia's armed actions in Ukraine are justified or unjustified?*

Background: Narratives that used false or misleading claims to offer justification for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine have been among the most prevalent and persistent disinformation themes across the SEE region since February 2022. The meta-narrative of the invasion as a justified, defensive response to an existential threat encompasses a broad cluster of sub-narratives, including framing the invasion as a “counteroffensive” and/or defensive response to NATO, the EU, or the West for provoking the war; depicting Ukraine as aggressive, extremist, or manipulated by foreign powers, and deny or relativize Russian responsibility by

framing Moscow as acting preventively or legitimately. Variants of this narrative include claims about biolabs, “denazification,” planned Ukrainian offensives, NATO troops fighting in Ukraine, false-flag operations, and the idea that Russia is resisting a broader anti-Russian Western project rather than waging an unprovoked war. These types of narratives have circulated at high volume and recurred over time in the countries covered by this research.

Results: Attitudes toward Russia’s armed actions in Ukraine are the most polarized among the narratives examined, with both the strongest country-level divergence and the clearest gender gap. At the regional level, **38.6%** of respondents consider Russia’s actions justified, while **53.5%** consider them unjustified and **8.0%** are undecided. Unlike the narratives concerning the EU, this claim is rejected by a regional majority.

Table 23: Russia’s armed actions in Ukraine: country breakdown

Country	Justified	Somewhat justified	Completely justified	Unjustified	Somewhat unjustified	Completely unjustified	Don't know
ALB	22.81%	12.69%	10.11%	68.80%	5.44%	63.36%	8.40%
BiH	32.20%	21.14%	11.07%	59.72%	15.15%	44.57%	8.08%
MNE	41.83%	22.67%	19.16%	50.85%	11.63%	39.22%	7.32%
SRB	58.07%	34.96%	23.11%	33.76%	11.85%	21.91%	8.17%
Regional average	38.55%	22.75%	15.79%	53.46%	10.96%	42.50%	8.00%

Serbia stands apart as the only country where a majority of respondents consider Russia’s actions justified (**58.1%**). Albania shows the clearest opposition on this issue as well, with only **22.8%** considering Russia’s actions justified and **68.8%** rejecting them. The gap between Serbia and Albania on justification is **35.3 percentage points**, making this the most divergent issue in the dataset. The difference is not only in the overall balance of opinion but also in intensity. In Albania, **63.4%** completely reject Russia’s actions, compared with only **10.1%** who completely justify them. Serbia shows the opposite pattern, with the highest levels of justification and the lowest levels of complete rejection.

Montenegro occupies an intermediate position and is more divided, with **41.8%** considering the actions justified and **50.9%** unjustified. Bosnia and Herzegovina records lower justification (**32.2%**) and stronger rejection (**59.7%**), but with pronounced differences between the entities. In the Federation of BiH, nearly three quarters of respondents (**72.5%**) regard Russia’s actions as unjustified, while only **20.1%** consider them justified. In contrast, a majority in Republika Srpska (**52.8%**) see Russia’s actions as justified and **38.1%** do not. Brčko District is evenly split, with equal shares of respondents (**43.5%**) on both sides. The **32.7 percentage point difference** between FBiH and RS represents the largest internal divide in the dataset and highlights the issue as the most polarizing among those examined between the two entities.

Region-wide, gender differences are also more pronounced on this issue than on most of the EU-related narratives. Men are substantially more likely to justify Russia’s actions than women

(**44.4%** compared with **32.1%**). Men are also twice as likely to completely justify them (**20.9%** compared with **10.1%**). Women are more likely to reject Russia’s actions, with **58.6%** considering them unjustified compared with **48.8%** of men. Women are also more likely to be undecided.

Table 24: Russia’s armed actions in Ukraine: gender breakdown

Gender	Justified	Somewhat justified	Completely justified	Unjustified	Somewhat unjustified	Completely unjustified	Don’t know
Men	44.40%	23.49%	20.91%	48.80%	9.14%	39.66%	6.80%
Women	32.05%	21.94%	10.11%	58.63%	12.98%	45.65%	9.33%
Total	38.54%	22.75%	15.79%	53.46%	10.96%	42.50%	8.00%

Demographic breakdown for tested statements

Other than the gender differences presented for each individual statement, several additional demographic differences were observed across the region.

Age groups

At the regional level, the **35-54 age group** emerges as the most consistently receptive to conspiratorial and disinformation narratives, with the highest level of agreement on six of the nine tested statements: the claim about migrants changing the ethnic structure of destination countries (**54.8%**), global elites wanting to reduce the world population (**62.5%**), a small group of powerful people controlling major world events (**75.1%**), “backfiring” of EU sanctions (**62.0%**), EU integration threatening traditional family values (**53.3%**), and Russia’s armed actions in Ukraine being justified (**41.1%**).

The **55+ age group** is most likely to agree with claims conveying science denial: that vaccines are more dangerous than beneficial (**53.9%**) and that climate change is not real (**42.1%**). However, agreement with the vaccine-related claim is high across all age groups, with only minor variation: **52.3%** among respondents aged 18-34, **52.8%** among those aged 35-54, and **53.9%** among those aged 55+. The age pattern is stronger in the case of climate change denial, where agreement rises from **29.7%** among respondents aged 18-34; to **38.8%** among those aged 35-54 and to **42.1%** among the group aged 55 and older.

The youngest respondents, **aged 18-34**, are the most likely to agree with only one statement: the claim that the EU is increasingly censoring free speech. Agreement with this claim stands at **58.5%** among respondents aged 18-34, compared with **53.1%** among those aged 35-54 and **51.3%** among those aged 55+.

The **strongest cross-age consensus** appears in relation to the claim that a small group of powerful people is responsible for major world events. Agreement is very high in all three age

groups: it stands at **74.2%** among respondents aged 18-34, **75.1%** among those aged 35-54, and **74.9%** among those aged 55+.

Country-level patterns show some variation. In Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 35-54 age group is most frequently the highest-agreement group. In **Montenegro**, this group records the highest agreement on five of the nine statements, including the migrant-related claim (**57.0%**), depopulation (**64.0%**), antivaccination (**54.8%**), EU as a threat to family values (**59.3%**), and justification of Russia's actions in Ukraine (**44.3%**). In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, the same age group also leads on five statements, including the antimigration narratives (**58.8%**), climate change denial (**44.0%**), depopulation (**69.0%**), antivaccination (**54.2%**), and EU sanctions "backfiring" (**65.0%**).

Serbia shows a different pattern, with the 55+ group recording the highest agreement on six of the nine statements. Older respondents in Serbia are the most likely to agree with climate change denial (**43.5%**), depopulation (**60.8%**), antivaccination (**49.9%**), sanctions backfiring (**69.4%**), EU as a threat to family values (**62.6%**), and justification of Russia's actions in Ukraine (**61.6%**). This makes Serbia the clearest case in which receptiveness to these narratives is concentrated among older respondents.

Albania shows a more mixed pattern. The 55+ group records the highest agreement on climate change denial (**42.7%**), EU sanctions weakening the EU (**52.1%**), traditional family values (**39.5%**), and EU censorship of free speech (**40.6%**). However, younger respondents are the most likely to agree with the claims about depopulation (**64.1%**) and secretive elite controlling major world events (**74.5%**), while the 35-54 group records the highest agreement on the antimigration claim (**50.1%**), antivaccination (**61.6%**), and justification of Russia's actions in Ukraine (**27.8%**).

Overall, the findings suggest that middle-aged respondents are the most consistently receptive to the tested narratives at the regional level, while older respondents stand out more clearly in Serbia and on specific themes such as climate change denial and vaccines. Younger respondents are not generally the most supportive group, but they show comparatively high agreement with the EU censorship narrative, and in Albania they are also the most receptive to some of the broader "global elites" and "hidden power" claims.

Level of education

Education appears to be a relevant but not fully linear factor in agreement with tested statements. Respondents with vocational or high school education emerge as the most consistently agreement-prone group. Across nearly all tested statements, this group records either the highest or second-highest levels of agreement, with particularly high support for statements on secretive elite controlling major world events (**77.01%**), depopulation (**61.79%**) and "backfiring" of EU sanctions against Russia (**61.57%**). This suggests that respondents with mid-level formal education represent the most consistently receptive educational group across the set of tested narratives.

Table 25: Level of education: overall agreement with tested statements

Narrative topic	Elementary	Secondary / vocational	Higher / university	Master/PhD
Antimigration	41.01%	51.15%	54.25%	45.12%
Climate change	40.15%	42.49%	32.66%	27.91%
Depopulation	52.61%	61.79%	62.40%	57.94%
Secretive elites	61.12%	77.01%	77.32%	72.09%
Antivaccination	61.39%	57.33%	46.61%	37.21%
Sanctions	48.35%	61.57%	64.62%	59.53%
Traditional values	47.47%	55.30%	50.77%	42.52%
Censorship	47.48%	57.57%	51.51%	46.05%
Ukraine invasion	26.94%	40.48%	40.43%	36.74%

Respondents with elementary education show a mixed pattern of agreement. They record the highest level of agreement on antivaccination statement (**61.39%**), indicating greater receptiveness to the specific narrative tested in that question. However, they are generally less likely than respondents with vocational or high school education to agree with most other claims. Their profile is also marked by comparatively high levels of uncertainty, with “Don’t know” responses reaching **15.47%** on antimigration statement and **15.50%** on justification of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This suggests that, among respondents with basic education, the pattern is not only one of agreement, but also of lower certainty or lower readiness to take a clear position.

Respondents with higher education show a more complex pattern of viewpoints. While their overall profile is more mixed than that of the vocational or high school group, they record relatively high agreement on several statements, including the antimigration, depopulation, hidden-power, and EU sanctions statements. In some cases, their agreement levels match or slightly exceed those recorded among respondents with vocational or high school education. This indicates that higher formal education does not necessarily function as a consistent protective factor against all conspiratorial or disinformation narratives.

Respondents with master’s or PhD-level education are the most resistant group overall. They consistently record the lowest levels of agreement, particularly on climate change denial (**27.91%**), antivaccination (**20.00%**) and justification of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (**36.74%**). However, agreement remains substantial on “depopulation” (**57.94%**) and “global elites” statement (**72.09%**), suggesting that these two narratives have broader cross-educational appeal and are not limited to groups with lower levels of formal education.

Overall, the findings suggest that lower and mid-level education are more strongly associated with receptiveness to conspiratorial and disinformation narratives, with respondents with vocational or high school education standing out as the most consistently at-risk group. At the

same time, the relatively high agreement among bachelor or college graduates on several items shows that formal education alone does not prevent acceptance of such narratives. The clearest educational divide appears among respondents with master’s or PhD-level education, who are the least likely to agree overall, although even this group shows notable receptiveness to some of the most widely accepted claims.

Information and verification habits

Online sources of information

When it comes to online sources of news Facebook stands out as most frequently mentioned by the respondents, with nearly half (**44.10%**) reporting that they check it for news at least once a week. Instagram (**34.10%**), YouTube (**23.30%**) and TikTok (**18.30%**) also have substantial reach.

The results also point to the importance of messaging and semi-private communication channels: Viber (**15.20%**), WhatsApp (**12.20%**), Facebook Messenger (**11.90%**) and Telegram (**8.20%**) together represent an important infrastructure for information circulation beyond open social media feeds.

Table 26: Online sources of information: all checked answers	
Facebook	44.10%
Instagram	34.10%
YouTube	23.30%
TikTok	18.30%
Viber	15.20%
WhatsApp	12.20%
Facebook messenger	11.90%
Telegram	8.20%
X (Twitter)	8.10%
Other	4.60%
Reddit	3.30%
Snapchat	1.90%

X/Twitter, Reddit and Snapchat remain comparatively marginal at the regional level. A minor percentage of respondents (**4.60%**) answered that they use “other” online sources of news at least once a week, mostly listing local news media websites as alternatives to large online platforms prompted in the survey. Out of the whole sample, only 71 respondents mentioned Google as a source they use to check news at least once a week.

Since respondents were able to select multiple answers to this question, another way to analyze the results is to look at which platforms they mentioned first in their responses. Facebook is still the dominant information source in the region, accounting for **39.32%** overall and leading in all four countries. The strongest concentration appears in BiH, where more than half of respondents name Facebook as their primary source (**51.43%**), while Montenegro is notably lower at **29.26%**. This creates the clearest country-level divergence in the table and suggests that the regional information environment is cohesive in its reliance on Facebook, but uneven in intensity.

	Albania	BiH	Montenegro	Serbia	Total
Facebook	40.12 %	51.43 %	29.26 %	35.95 %	39.32 %
None	18.72 %	10.08 %	17.03 %	16.92 %	15.65 %
Instagram	16.15 %	11.91 %	17.76 %	15.04 %	15.20 %
YouTube	8.54 %	5.70 %	8.67 %	8.30 %	7.79 %
Viber	0.21 %	5.70 %	5.12 %	5.97 %	4.22 %
WhatsApp	8.23 %	2.14 %	3.03 %	1.55 %	3.77 %
TikTok	4.53 %	2.85 %	2.82 %	4.20 %	3.59 %
Other	1.13 %	3.26 %	5.75 %	3.32 %	3.36 %
X (Twitter)	0.10 %	2.75 %	3.87 %	4.09 %	2.67 %
Facebook messenger	1.75 %	2.14 %	4.28 %	1.99 %	2.54 %
Telegram	0.41 %	1.93 %	1.78 %	1.88 %	1.49 %
Reddit	0.10 %	0.00 %	0.31 %	0.77 %	0.29 %
Snapchat	0.00 %	0.10 %	0.31 %	0.00 %	0.10 %
Total	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %

A sizable share of respondents report having no primary online source (**15.65%** regionally), especially in Albania, Montenegro and Serbia. Instagram forms a relatively stable second tier across the region, while YouTube remains modest and fairly consistent. The most visible platform-specific divergence appears around messaging apps: WhatsApp is much more relevant in Albania, while Viber is almost absent there but more visible in BiH, Montenegro and Serbia.

Verification

The respondents across the region demonstrate moderate verification habits. Regionally, **24.12%** of respondents say they check online news always, **17.56%** report doing so often, with additional **18.79%** report that they do so at least sometimes. At the same time, the fact that **39.51%** verify information only rarely or never indicates a significant vulnerability to unverified online content.

Table 28: Verification habits by country						
Country	Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Total
ALB	17.67 %	15.91 %	16.22 %	15.60 %	34.61 %	100.00 %
BiH	22.91 %	18.72 %	22.59 %	13.60 %	22.18 %	
MNE	28.23 %	17.06 %	17.17 %	12.82 %	24.72 %	
SRB	27.81 %	18.61 %	19.25 %	11.66 %	22.67 %	
Regional average	24.12 %	17.56 %	18.79 %	13.43 %	26.08 %	100.00 %

The main regional divergence appears in the extremes. Albania stands out with the weakest verification pattern: only **33.58%** verify news always or often, while **34.61%** say they never do so. This makes Albania the only country where the “never” category is higher than the combined “always” and “often” responses. Serbia and Montenegro report comparatively stronger verification habits, with **46.42%** and **45.29%** respectively checking news always or often, followed by BiH at **41.63%**.

Overall, the region shows moderate attitudinal cohesion, but with Albania as a clear outlier. Serbia, Montenegro and BiH are relatively close in the share of respondents who say that they verify information at least sometimes, ranging from **62.46% to 65.67%**, while Albania is substantially lower at **49.80%**.

Perception of fact-checkers’ work

Perception ratings were analyzed both at the country level and as a regional average, including across three demographic dimensions: gender, level of education, and type of settlement (urban vs. rural). In Serbia, two newsrooms were rated by the same pool of 1,010 respondents, so the regional average was calculated as an unweighted mean of the five newsroom figures to avoid double-counting Serbian respondents.

At the regional level, **70.38%** of respondents either have not heard of the fact-checking outlet in their country or did not have an opinion on its content. Cross-country differences are moderate. Awareness is highest in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, where approximately two thirds of respondents are unable to assess the quality of fact-checkers’ work, or have not heard about the fact-checking newsroom. Albania occupies an intermediate position, while Serbia records the lowest level of familiarity, with **70.70%** and **82.9%** of respondents unable to assess the quality of fact-checking websites Raskrikavanje and FakeNews Tragač, respectively.

Table 29: Fact-checking outlet quality rating: aggregated comparison by newsroom

	Faktoje	Raskrinkavanje (BiH)	Raskrinkavanje (MNE)	Raskrikavanje	FakeNews Tragač	Regional average
Positive (Good + Very good)	11.40%	13.90%	14.60%	14.40%	7.60%	12.38%
Neutral (Average)	12.60%	15.20%	13.50%	9.70%	6.50%	11.50%
Negative (Bad + Very bad)	7%	5.80%	7.90%	5.30%	3%	6%
No opinion (Don't know / haven't heard of)	69.10%	65.20%	64%	70.70%	82.90%	70.38%
Total	100%					

While overall awareness of fact-checking websites is low across the region, among respondents who are familiar with these outlets, evaluations are generally favorable. Only **6.0%** of respondents rate the quality of content negatively, compared with **10.9%** who provide positive assessments. An additional **11.5%** evaluate the content as average. Raskrinkavanje.me records the highest share of positive assessments (**14.6%**), followed closely by Raskrikavanje (**14.4%**) and Raskrinkavanje.ba (**13.9%**). Faktoje records somewhat lower levels of positive evaluations (**11.4%**), as does FakeNews Tragač (**7.60%**). Negative assessments are low across all countries, suggesting that lack of visibility, rather than lack of credibility, constitutes the main obstacle to broader public engagement with fact-checking websites.

Table 30: Fact-checking outlet quality rating: full-scale comparison by newsroom

How would you rate the quality of content on:	Faktoje	Raskrinkavanje (BiH)	Raskrinkavanje (MNE)	Raskrikavanje	FakeNews Tragač	Regional average
Very good	2.90%	3%	3.50%	3.80%	2.20%	3.08%
Good	8.50%	10.90%	11.10%	10.60%	5.40%	9.30%
Average	12.60%	15.20%	13.50%	9.70%	6.50%	11.50%
Bad	3.10%	2.90%	4.70%	3.20%	2.10%	3.20%
Very bad	3.90%	2.90%	3.20%	2.10%	0.90%	2.60%
Don't know / haven't heard	69.10%	65.20%	64%	70.70%	82.90%	70.38%
Total	100%					

Demographic breakdown: Perception of fact-checkers

Gender differences in perception of fact-checking newsrooms are marginal, with nearly identical regional averages for men and women who see their work as good or very good (**12.2%** and **12.6%** respectively). Country-level differences also rarely exceed a few percentage points. The largest difference is in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where men rate Raskrikavanje more positively than women (**15.6%** vs. **11.9%**).¹

Table 31: Perception of fact-checking newsrooms by gender					
Country	Gender	Positive	Neutral	Negative	No opinion
Albania	Female	12.70%	13.10%	5.80%	68.40%
	Male	10.40%	12.20%	7.80%	69.50%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Female	11.90%	16.40%	5.70%	66.00%
	Male	15.60%	14.10%	5.80%	64.40%
Montenegro	Female	14.60%	12.60%	6.70%	66.10%
	Male	14.70%	14.50%	9.10%	61.80%
Serbia (Raskrikavanje)	Female	15.20%	11.50%	5.50%	67.80%
	Male	13.50%	7.80%	5.00%	73.60%
Serbia (FNT)	Female	8.40%	7.80%	2.70%	81.10%
	Male	6.80%	5.20%	3.20%	84.70%
Total (region)	Female	12.60%	12.30%	5.30%	69.90%
	Male	12.20%	10.80%	6.20%	70.80%

Settlement type produces a modest but consistent difference. Urban respondents are slightly more likely to rate fact-checkers positively (**13.2%** vs. **11.7%** for rural), and slightly less likely to report not knowing the outlet. The gap is largest in Bosnia and Herzegovina (**17.6%** urban vs. **10.8%** rural positive) and smallest in Serbia, where Raskrikavanje and FNT show near-identical rates across both settlement types. Montenegro is the only country where rural respondents report more positive perception than urban ones (**15.20%** vs. **14.40%**).

¹ Some fact-checking newsrooms mentioned in the survey share near-identical or identical names: Raskrikavanje in Serbia and two newsrooms, both named Raskrinkavanje, in BiH and Montenegro. All three operate in the same language and often fact-check content from each other's countries. These factors could have contributed to a cross-border name familiarity effects not present for Faktoje and FakeNews Tragač, but this was not tested in the survey.

Table 32: Perception of fact-checking newsrooms by settlement type

Country	Settlement type	Positive	Neutral	Negative	No opinion
Albania	Rural	9.20%	10.30%	6.80%	73.70%
	Urban	12.60%	13.90%	7.00%	66.50%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Rural	10.80%	15.50%	5.70%	68.10%
	Urban	17.60%	14.80%	5.90%	61.70%
Montenegro	Rural	15.20%	15.90%	9.40%	59.40%
	Urban	14.40%	12.60%	7.30%	65.70%
Serbia (Raskrikavanje)	Rural	14.10%	8.00%	6.60%	71.30%
	Urban	14.50%	10.70%	4.40%	70.30%
Serbia (FNT)	Rural	9.00%	6.40%	2.40%	82.20%
	Urban	6.80%	6.60%	3.30%	83.30%
Total (region)	Rural	11.70%	11.20%	6.20%	70.90%
	Urban	13.20%	11.70%	5.60%	69.50%

Education shows a clearer gradient compared to gender and settlement type. Respondents with higher education or postgraduate qualifications are consistently more likely to rate fact-checking outlets positively and less likely to report not knowing them. Across the regional average, positive ratings rise from **8.6%** among those with primary school or less to **18.6%** among university-educated and postgraduate respondents. This pattern holds in all four countries, and is most pronounced in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the gap between the lowest and highest education groups reaches **31 percentage points**.

Table 33: Perception of fact-checking newsrooms by education

Newsroom	Education level	Positive	Neutral	Negative	No opinion
Faktoje (AL)	Primary school or less	11.20%	11.60%	6.60%	70.70%
	Secondary school	7.40%	10.70%	8.40%	73.60%
	Vocational school	10.90%	13.00%	4.30%	71.70%
	Higher education / University	14.70%	12.50%	7.30%	65.60%
	Postgraduate (Master's/PhD)	15.60%	20.80%	6.20%	57.30%
Raskrinkavanje (BiH)	Primary school or less	4.20%	10.40%	9.40%	76.00%
	Secondary school	12.80%	15.80%	6.80%	64.50%
	Vocational school	12.70%	16.40%	5.50%	65.50%
	Higher education / University	18.10%	15.80%	3.90%	62.30%
	Postgraduate (Master's/PhD)	35.70%	0.00%	0.00%	64.30%
Raskrinkavanje (MNE)	Primary school or less	7.50%	9.00%	11.90%	71.60%
	Secondary school	15.60%	12.70%	7.80%	63.90%
	Vocational school	7.10%	14.30%	14.30%	64.30%
	Higher education / University	14.90%	14.90%	7.20%	62.90%
Raskrikavanje (SRB)	Primary school or less	11.00%	1.80%	6.40%	80.70%
	Secondary school	13.80%	8.90%	5.40%	71.80%
	Vocational school	12.50%	10.70%	8.90%	67.90%
	Higher education / University	16.90%	12.30%	4.60%	66.30%
	Postgraduate (Master's/PhD)	12.90%	11.40%	0.00%	75.70%
FakeNews Tragač (SRB)	Primary school or less	9.20%	3.70%	0.90%	86.20%
	Secondary school	8.10%	7.60%	2.70%	81.60%
	Vocational school	5.40%	4.50%	4.50%	85.70%
	Higher education / University	6.90%	7.70%	3.10%	82.30%
	Postgraduate (Master's/PhD)	10.00%	2.90%	4.30%	82.90%
Total	Primary school or less	8.60%	7.30%	7.00%	77.00%
	Secondary school	11.50%	11.10%	6.20%	71.10%
	Vocational school	9.70%	11.80%	7.50%	71.00%
	Higher education / University	14.30%	12.60%	5.20%	67.90%
	Postgraduate (Master's/PhD)	18.60%	8.80%	2.60%	70.10%

Age-wise, respondents in the **35-54 group** are the most likely to know or assess fact-checking newsrooms, with **34.8%** able to provide a rating. They also record the highest positive perception, at **15.1%**. The youngest group follows closely, with **32.6%** able to rate and **14.6%** giving a positive assessment.

Respondents aged 55+ are the least familiar with fact-checking newsrooms. Nearly three quarters of this group, **72.3%**, say they do not know or have not heard of the fact-checker active in their country. They also record the lowest positive and highest negative perception: **9.8%** and **6.7%** respectively.

Age group	Aware / able to rate	Positive	Average	Negative	Don't know / haven't heard
18-34	32.60%	14.60%	12.60%	5.40%	67.40%
35-54	34.80%	15.10%	13.70%	6.10%	65.20%
55+	27.70%	9.80%	11.20%	6.70%	72.30%

Country-level patterns show that the relationship between age and fact-checker perception is not uniform. In **Albania**, younger respondents are the most familiar with fact-checking newsrooms: **43.2%** of those aged 18-34 are able to rate them, compared with only **20.4%** of respondents aged 55+. Positive perception declines sharply with age, from **17.2%** among younger respondents to **6.8%** among older respondents.

In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, the strongest familiarity is among respondents aged **35-54**, with **38.5%** able to provide a rating. This group also records the highest positive perception, at **16.7%**. Older respondents are almost as likely to be aware, at **36.4%**, but they are also the most likely to express a negative perception, at **8.3%**.

In **Montenegro**, the highest share of respondents able to rate the fact-checking newsroom is found among those aged **55+**, at **37.0%**, while the highest positive perception is among respondents aged **35-54**, at **16.0%**. The oldest group also records the highest negative perception, at **9.9%**, suggesting greater familiarity but also more critical views.

In **Serbia**, an average result for both fact-checking newsrooms was analyzed, to find that familiarity on average remains low across all age groups. Both the youngest and the middle aged groups are able to rate fact-checking newsrooms at around **25%**. Respondents aged 55+ are the least familiar, with **79.3%** saying they do not know or have not heard of the newsrooms. They also record the lowest positive perception, at **7.8%**.

Conclusions

The study shows that conspiratorial and disinformation narratives have a substantial presence in public opinion across Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia, although their level of acceptance varies by topic. Several tested narratives are, however, supported by majorities in all four countries, indicating that these claims are not marginal phenomena but part of a broader regional pattern of distrust toward institutions, science and international actors.

The strongest and most consistent support is recorded for broad “hidden power” narratives. The claim that a small group of powerful people controls major world events is the most widely accepted statement in the survey, while the belief that global elites want to reduce the world population also receives majority support across the region. These narratives appear to function as flexible interpretive frameworks through which respondents, region-wide, make sense of political, social, and global developments.

At the same time, the research shows that not all disinformation narratives are equally persuasive. Climate change denial is the least accepted claim and the only tested conspiratorial statement rejected by an absolute majority of respondents in every country. Vaccine-related disinformation and antimigration conspiracies occupy a more contested space, with substantial levels of both agreement and disagreement. This suggests that public vulnerability to disinformation depends strongly on the topic and on the extent to which a narrative resonates with existing social, political, or cultural concerns.

Geopolitical narratives also show broad but uneven resonance. Claims that EU sanctions against Russia have weakened the EU, that EU integration threatens traditional family values, and that the EU is increasingly censoring free speech all receive significant support. Attitudes toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are more polarized and more strongly shaped by country context, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where entity-level differences are particularly pronounced.

Demographic patterns are relevant but not straightforward. Middle-aged respondents are the most consistently receptive to the tested narratives at the regional level, while older respondents stand out more clearly on science-related claims such as climate change denial and vaccine safety. Education also matters, but it does not operate as a simple protective factor. Respondents with vocational or high school education are the most consistently agreement-prone group, while those with master’s or PhD-level education are generally the most resistant. However, relatively high levels of agreement among bachelor or college graduates on several claims show that formal education alone does not prevent acceptance of disinformation narratives.

The findings on information habits point to a regional online environment strongly shaped by large social media platforms, especially Facebook. Messaging applications and video platforms also play an important role. A high share of messaging apps is particularly relevant because disinformation also tends to circulate through semi-private communication channels where

detection, verification and public correction are more difficult. Verification habits reveal an important vulnerability. Although a substantial share of respondents say they check online information always or often, a large proportion verify news only rarely or never.

The perception of fact-checking organizations points to a different but equally important challenge: limited visibility. Across the region, most respondents either have not heard of the relevant fact-checking newsroom or do not feel able to assess its work. Among those who are familiar with fact-checkers, evaluations are more often positive or neutral than negative. This suggests that the main obstacle for fact-checking initiatives is the reach and recognition among broader audiences.

Taken together, the results indicate that counter-disinformation efforts in the region need to address both belief and exposure. The high acceptance of several tested narratives shows the need for long-term public communication strategies that respond not only to individual false claims, but also to the broader worldviews that make such claims persuasive. At the same time, the limited visibility of fact-checking organizations suggests that their impact depends not only on the quality of their work, but also on their ability to reach audiences beyond those already familiar with fact-checking.

Evidence base for selected statements

Evidence-base for selection of statements conveying conspiratorial and disinformation narratives was built using the following fact-checks and analysis published by SEE Check and/or its members:

1. [State of disinformation: SEE region in 2023](#)
2. [State of disinformation: SEE region in 2024](#)
3. [State of disinformation: SEE region in 2025](#)
4. [E keqinterpretuar ideja e Bill Gates për reduktimin e rritjes së popullsisë së botës](#)
5. [Manipulativno izrezana izjava nije "dokaz" za teoriju zavjere o depopulaciji](#)
6. [Kamala Harris nuk sugjeroi "reduktimin e popullsisë"](#)
7. [Ne, Žak Atali nije 1981. godine najavio pandemiju](#)
8. [Kisindžer govorio o ublažavanju populacionog rasta, a ne depopulaciji zemalja trećeg svijeta](#)
9. [Bill Gates nije "najavio depopulaciju", niti ga je Indija "tužila zbog vakcina" - i to se već godinama zna](#)
10. [Vajza e ish-kreut të Forumit Ekonomik Botëror nuk zbuloi komplotin për vrasjen e miliardave](#)
11. [The Web Portal Srbin Info Continues to Publish Absurd Disinformation About COVID-19 Vaccines](#)
12. [Web Portals Claim: "Climate Change is a Myth; Depopulation is the Agenda of the Powerful"](#)
13. [NASA Did Not Show a "Mass Extinction Plan" in the Presentation](#)
14. [Svetski ekonomski forum nije otkrio nikakav „plan za depopulaciju 1 milijarde belaca"](#)
15. [Portali: Klimatske promene ne postoje, plan moćnika je depopulacija](#)
16. [Ne, Bil Gejts nije kreator strategije „zlatna milijarda"](#)
17. [Nestorović "objasnio geopolitiku" nizom neistina i dezinformacija](#)

18. [Gejts nije priznao da je testirao nanotehnologiju u vakcinama](#)
19. [Studimi mbi 17 milionë viktime nga vaksinimi bazohet në përlogaritje të pasakta](#)
20. [I pasaktë pretendimi se vaksina anti-Covid rriti shanset e vdekjeve me 73.9 %](#)
21. [Despite Five Infant Deaths, Anti-Vaxxers Persist in Discouraging Vaccination Among Parents](#)
22. [WHO Members Did Not Criminalize Speech Opposing Vaccination](#)
23. [Niti je vakcinacija “nepotrebna”, niti MMR vakcina izaziva autizam](#)
24. [Autizam imaju i djeca Amiša, uzrok nije MMR vakcina](#)
25. [Despite Five Infant Deaths, Anti-Vaxxers Persist in Discouraging Vaccination Among Parents](#)
26. [Disinformation during Covid-19 pandemic](#)
27. [Studimi mbi 17 milionë viktime nga vaksinimi bazohet në përlogaritje të pasakta](#)
28. [pasaktë pretendimi se vaksina anti-Covid rriti shanset e vdekjeve me 73.9%](#)
29. [Despite five infant deaths, anti-vaxxers persist in discouraging vaccination among parents](#)
30. [WHO members did not criminalize speech opposing vaccination](#)
31. [The EU-India Agreement is not evidence for the “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory](#)
32. [Soros nuk financon anijet humanitare që shpëtojnë emigrantë në Mesdhe](#)
33. [Svetski ekonomski forum nije otkrio nikakav plan za depopulaciju 1 milijarde belaca](#)
34. [Myslmanët nuk përbëjnë 85% të refugjatëve në botë](#)
35. [Ne, Svilajncu i Braničevu ne preti najezda “Alahovih sledbenika”](#)
36. [Lažne objave o migrantima na Instagram stranici “Deportacija”](#)
37. [Antimigrantske dezinformacije: Promašene tvrdnje o “mržnji prema svemu što je bijelo”](#)
38. [Laž do laži: žene sa kolaža nisu žrtve migranata](#)
39. [“Napadaju i siluju” — novi talas vesti protiv migranata](#)
40. [Od lažne prijave do “tumačenja genetskog koda”: Obračun sa migrantima koji se nikada nije desio](#)
41. [Preko margine: Dezinformacije o marginaliziranim grupama u bh. medijima](#)
42. [Ne, srpski pasoš se ne deli migrantima “kao bombone”](#)
43. [RTRS i “Defter hefte” u istoj misiji](#)
44. [O podeli kuća migrantima](#)
45. [Trojica migranata nisu dobila srpsko državljanstvo, već grčke boravišne dozvole](#)
46. [Profit over planet: How climate disinformation serves the fossil fuel industry](#)
47. [It is not true that the EU has admitted that HAARP is a climate weapon](#)
48. [HAARP, geopolitics and other fantasies: What was made up about the earthquake in Turkey and Syria](#)
49. [The “climate lockdown” conspiracy theory has no basis in actual facts](#)
50. [No one will make us eat bugs](#)
51. [The European Union has approved cricket flour, but that does not mean that Marin Miletić has to eat it](#)
52. [Manipulative claims about the Russian economy being the strongest in Europe](#)
53. [It is not true that Macron is not in favor of sanctions against Russia](#)
54. [Kako i na koga utiču sankcije koje je Zapad uveo Rusiji](#)
55. [Manipulativne tvrdnje o ruskoj ekonomiji kao najjačoj u Evropi](#)
56. [Svjetska banka nije predložila da se ublaže sankcije Rusiji](#)
57. [Mađarska nije ukinula sankcije Rusiji](#)
58. [Evropa nuk e shtoi volumni tregtar me Rusinë gjatë sanksioneve](#)
59. [Shqipëria, Serbia dhe Mali i Zi nuk i thyen sanksionet kundër Rusisë](#)
60. [Did the German police take children away from their parents because of their views on homosexuality?](#)
61. [The invented story of Sister Milka as a justification for opposing EuroPride](#)

62. Scaremongering with the Sexual Minority Equality Strategy: The EU will not force parents to allow children to change their sex
63. Mother monument as a tool of anti-Western propaganda
64. No, the EU has not adopted a law on changing children's gender regardless of their age
65. The European Digital Services Act is not a tool of censorship
66. Is the EU really planning to censor Telegram? Not quite
67. Izjava Fon der Lajen izvučena iz konteksta
68. EU ne nalaže Mađarskoj da prikazuje LGBTQ sadržaje djeci
69. Advocacy briefs: Increasing the support of key stakeholders for a meaningful alignment with EU digital legislation
70. Evropska unija nije rekla da na Twitteru ima previše slobode govora, niti da treba angažovati više cenzora
71. DSA nije zakon o cenzuri
72. EU ne prijete zatvorom onima koji misle svojom glavom
73. A conspiracy journalist justifies the Russian invasion using anti-semitic conspiracy theories
74. The American "confession" that the invasion of Ukraine was a response to a threat does not exist
75. Zelensky did not admit in 2019 that he was planning an invasion of Donbas
76. There is no evidence that Russian troops captured 30 NATO officers in Kursk
77. Live blog: Disinformation about the war in Ukraine
78. Serijal Raskrinkavanja: Narativi o invaziji na Ukrajinu
79. The American "confession" that the invasion of Ukraine was a response to a threat does not exist
80. Analysis of 4,000 domestic media articles on the war in Ukraine: The dominance of the pro-Russian narrative
81. Nomen est omen: Kako mediji nazivaju rat u Ukrajini
82. Debunking/ "Hitleri ishte hebre" dhe portretizimi i luftës në Ukrainë si luftë kundër neonazizmit