SEE Check publishes a third round of country reports, this time giving a comprehensive overview of the disinformation landscape across the region for the year 2025.
Introduction
In a series of country reports, SEE Check network gives a comprehensive overview of the disinformation landscape across the region. For the year 2023, SEE Check has published a baseline state of disinformation reports for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Albania, as well as a regional report covering the SEE/WB region, including contributions from Serbia.
The same goes for the year 2024, when SEE Check published state of disinformation reports for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Albania, as well as a regional report covering the SEE/WB region.
This report builds upon the previous one, providing updates from 2025 relevant to the information environment in BiH. The BiH country report is a contribution of Raskrinkavanje.ba, a fact-checking platform from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Raskrinkavanje, founded in 2017 by CA “Zašto ne”, has been a verified signatory of International Fact-Checking network (IFCN) since 2019, European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) since 2023, Meta’s partner in the Third party fact-checking program since 2020 and a founding member of the regional SEE Check network.
Disinformation Topics and Narratives
The Office of the High Representative (OHR), the international institution mandated to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, continued to be a frequent target of disinformation in 2025. As noted in the 2023 report, such narratives intensified following the appointment of the current High Representative, Christian Schmidt. Claims disputing the legitimacy of his mandate most commonly alleged that his appointment was unlawful due to the absence of confirmation by the United Nations Security Council – a position consistently advanced by the authorities in Republika Srpska.
This narrative gained particular prominence in 2025, as it became intertwined with a broader constitutional crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The President of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, was sentenced to one year in prison and banned from holding political office for six years for failing to implement decisions issued by the High Representative. Following the verdict, Dodik initiated legislative measures widely interpreted as undermining the constitutional order of the state. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina subsequently suspended these laws on a temporary basis. In response to these developments, arrest warrants were issued for Dodik and the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, Nenad Stevandić.
After the sentence was upheld, early elections in Republika Srpska were called, with voting scheduled for 23 November.
The proceedings against Dodik, the court’s ruling and the ensuing political developments triggered a significant wave of disinformation concerning the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Narratives frequently portrayed Dodik as a “defender” or “savior” of Serbs in the country, while depicting Christian Schmidt as an adversary acting against Serb interests. Many of these claims drew on previously debunked disinformation related to the High Representative’s mandate, the Dayton Peace Agreement and the role of the United Nations. In parallel, misleading and false claims directly targeting the legal case and verdict itself circulated widely across both traditional and social media. Raskrinkavanje.ba addressed numerous such examples throughout the year, identifying recurring patterns aimed at delegitimizing judicial institutions and deepening political polarization (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10).
As documented in both the baseline and the 2024 annual report, ethnonationalist narratives, most frequently tied to the wars of the 1990s, remained among the most pervasive forms of disinformation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2025. Historical revisionism continued to serve as a central pillar of the country’s disinformation ecosystem, reinforcing social divisions and exacerbating regional tensions. Throughout 2025, Raskrinkavanje fact-checked both recycled falsehoods concerning wartime events, such as the genocide in Srebrenica and the Markale massacres (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), as well as newly emerging disinformation narratives linked to current political and social developments in the region (1, 2, 3, 4).
One of the most prominent disinformation topics in 2025 concerned the large-scale, student-led protests in neighboring Serbia. The demonstrations began after the collapse of a canopy at the railway station in Novi Sad in late 2024, which resulted in 16 fatalities. The tragedy triggered widespread public outrage and sustained protests demanding accountability and a transparent investigation. Following attacks on peaceful demonstrators, students across Serbia organized university blockades, effectively suspending academic activities. Near-daily protests throughout the country were accompanied by a surge of disinformation in both Serbian and regional media spaces. Dominant narratives alleged that the protests were orchestrated or manipulated by foreign actors seeking to destabilize Serbia. Raskrinkavanje addressed numerous claims advancing this framing, which sought to delegitimize authentic civic mobilization by portraying it as externally engineered (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).
Aforementioned ethnonationalist narratives were also instrumentalized by certain media outlets close to the Serbian authorities to further discredit the protesters. In particular, recurring claims suggested that acknowledging or condemning the genocide in Srebrenica amounted to labeling the Serbian people as “genocidal.” This narrative was repurposed to depict the protesters as hostile to national interests and aligned against Serbia. Raskrinkavanje fact-checked multiple instances of these claims, assessing them as efforts to portray calls for accountability and democratic reform as expressions of alleged anti-Serb sentiment (1, 2, 3).
In parallel, disinformation narratives forecasting imminent conflict and regional destabilization were widespread in Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout 2025. These claims frequently invoked the specter of renewed violence, suggesting an impending escalation of inter-ethnic tensions. Given the country’s recent history and the enduring legacy of the 1990s conflicts, such narratives carry particular risks. By amplifying fear-based messaging and reactivating wartime trauma, they contribute to deepening mistrust among citizens and undermine prospects for reconciliation and social cohesion (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).
Globally circulating political narratives continued to reverberate in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2025, often adapted to the local political context. Following an executive order signed by Donald Trump suspending United States foreign assistance, which significantly affected the operations of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), disinformation and conspiracy narratives targeting the agency proliferated internationally. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, this development was instrumentalized to discredit political opponents, independent media and civil society organizations. Central to these narratives were unsubstantiated claims that USAID funds had been misappropriated, with allegations that hundreds of millions of dollars had “disappeared” within the country. Additional claims misrepresented the purpose and allocation of USAID-funded programs. Throughout the year, Raskrinkavanje fact-checked numerous examples of such disinformation, identifying systematic attempts to frame international assistance as inherently corrupt and politically manipulative (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).
Similarly to previous years, 2025 also saw the continued spread of narratives portraying the European Union as an actor seeking to expand control over citizens at the expense of fundamental freedoms. Disinformation underpinning this narrative most frequently targeted EU legislation, distorting the scope and intent of specific laws and policy initiatives. The EU was repeatedly depicted as imposing undue restrictions on individual choice, through claims that it intended to abolish cash payments, ban certain categories of vehicles or curtail freedom of expression. Raskrinkavanje addressed multiple instances of such claims, which relied on misrepresentation and exaggeration to foster distrust toward European institutions (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
In a similar vein, other global actors, including the United Nations and the World Health Organization, were depicted within disinformation narratives as participants in alleged schemes to curtail citizens’ freedoms. These claims typically asserted that international organizations were working toward the establishment of a “world government,” purportedly undermining national sovereignty and acting against the interests of individual states and their populations. Raskrinkavanje identified and fact-checked multiple variations of this narrative, which relied on conspiratorial interpretations of international cooperation and policy frameworks (1, 2, 3, 4).
Another conspiratorial narrative that gained traction in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2025 revolved around so-called “alternative history.” Rooted in historical revisionism, this narrative promotes the claim that established historical knowledge has been deliberately falsified to conceal information that would allegedly threaten those in power. Among the recurring themes were assertions about a fabricated, technologically advanced Tartaria empire and claims regarding the suppression of “free energy” technologies. According to proponents of this narrative, unspecified “elites” are intentionally hiding such truths to preserve political and economic dominance. Throughout the year, Raskrinkavanje fact-checked numerous claims associated with this narrative, identifying them as part of a broader pattern of conspiratorial reinterpretation of history and science (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
Scientific topics remained among the most frequent targets of disinformation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2025. In particular, anti-vaccination narratives and climate change denial continued to shape a significant portion of the country’s disinformation landscape.
Anti-vaccination actors targeted a broad spectrum of immunization programs, ranging from relatively recent vaccines against Covid-19 to long-established vaccines that have been in use for decades. This trend represents a continuation of patterns identified in previous country reports published by SEE Check, underscoring both their persistence and the need for sustained responses. Throughout 2025, Raskrinkavanje analyzed numerous pieces of viral and widely shared content promoting harmful and misleading claims about vaccines. In some instances, these claims recycled long-debunked falsehoods, such as the assertion that vaccines cause autism, while in others they relied on misinterpretations of new scientific studies or emerging medical developments, presented as evidence of alleged vaccine-related harm. In both cases, the narratives sought to undermine public trust in immunization and health institutions (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8).
Climate change denial likewise remained a durable anti-scientific narrative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the wider region. Throughout 2025, denialist actors continued to circulate claims disputing the existence of climate change or minimizing the role of human activity in driving it. These narratives gained additional visibility in the broader international context, often through statements by prominent political figures such as Donald Trump. The disinformation underpinning climate denial most frequently relied on selectively presented, misinterpreted or manipulated data framed as scientific evidence. By distorting established research and consensus, such claims contributed to confusion about climate science and impeded informed public debate (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8).
Actors Contributing to the Spread of Disinformation
By the end of 2025, Raskrinkavanje has expanded its database to over 3.850 media and social media sources whose claims were fact-checked on the website at least once since 2017. During 2025, Raskrinkavanje rated and stored 2.669 articles and social media posts that contained disinformation or other types of information manipulation. These were published by 698 different sources.
When it comes to the structure of these sources, the trend of social media dominance has reached a peak. Out of all rated sources, the six major social media platforms (Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Telegram, YouTube, X) were responsible for 699 rated pieces of content, while the remaining 1.970 were individual websites.
Social media accounts, particularly on Facebook, were the absolute leaders in disinformation production in 2025. Facebook accounts and pages alone accounted for 583 rated cases, making it the most proliferant platform by far. Instagram (36) and X/Twitter (32) followed as 8th and 10th most rated sources. Telegram was on 21st place with 17 rated disinformation, followed by Youtube on 22nd place (16), as well as TikTok on 25th place (15). A major portion of social media disinformation in 2025 was driven by a massive wave of “for-profit” scams (fake giveaways involving cars or cash prizes), alongside AI-generated content and pseudo-scientific health claims.
The “disinformation hub” from Republika Srpska and Serbia identified in previous reports, remains the leader of political disinformation and ethno-nationalist narratives. In 2025, RTRS emerged as the single most rated individual media outlet with 62 rated articles. It was closely followed in the top 6 list by the already identified actors: Alo (50), Informer (50), Srna (43), Novosti (42) and Kurir (37). Other significant contributors in top 50 rated sources among this hub in 2025 included Alternativna televizija (35), Glas Srpske (23), Republika (22), Srbija danas (16), Nezavisne (12), Blic (9), Sputnik (8) and Tanjug (8).
New prominent sources which were not part of the hub identified in 2019, but share similar disinformation narratives, have also gained significant traction. Those include Pozitivna Srpska (27), Banjaluka net (24), Faktor magazin (22), BL portal (20), RT Balkan (15), Pink (19), Večernje novosti (15), B92 and Espreso (12) Princip (11), Argumenti (10), Blink, Srpska cafe and Telegraf (10), NS uživo and Radio Televizija Vojvodine (8).
Among top 50 disinformation sources in BiH in 2025, 19 of them are outlets from Serbia, which shows continuous foreign influence from this neighboring country. Among outlets based in Serbia, two of them (Sputnik and RT Balkan) are Russian state-owned media, which serve as disseminators of Russian state propaganda in Balkans countries.
In the Federation of BiH, the mainstream media landscape remained prone mostly to clickbait and unverified reporting, with much less political disinformation. Slobodna Bosna (11) and Avaz (10) were the most frequently rated outlets from FBiH, followed by Bosna info and Poskok (9), Cazin net, Oslobođenje and Radio Sarajevo (7), as well as N1, Bljesak and 072 (6).
Narratives in 2025 shifted towards more specific local issues and historical revisionism topics compared to 2024, while global topics were dominated by conspiracy theories that covered geopolitical shifts and fears of technology. Sources like Nulta tačka (21), Epoha (16) and Logično (7) continued to be the primary distributors of these global conspiracy theories into the local language.
When it comes to individuals who promoted disinformation in BiH, Raskrinkavanje recorded that Branko Petrić, a former president of the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, expressed deep skepticism regarding the implementation of new electoral technologies, characterizing them as obsolete equipment from European warehouses being pushed by lobbyists. He claimed that the specific biometric identification and scanning tools proposed for the 2026 General Elections do not exist anywhere else in the world, despite international data showing such technologies are used in nearly a third of all countries. Petrić further dismissed the use of optical scanners as a “stupidity” that provides no real benefit, arguing that the large physical format of certain ballots would make the scanning machines impractically large.
Aleksandar Radeta, a resigned member of the Republic Election Commission of Republika Srpska and former head of the Banja Luka City Election Commission, utilized his platform to undermine the integrity of electronic voting systems by citing debunked international conspiracies. He argued that if the 2020 presidential elections in the United States could be “stolen” from Donald Trump, then voters in Bosnia and Herzegovina should have no confidence in local administrators using similar technologies. His statements served to reinforce a broader narrative that electoral technology is a tool for manipulation rather than a safeguard against fraud.
Jasmin Mulahusić, a well-known social media influencer and open supporter of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), frequently disseminates manipulated content to support his political leanings and target opponents. In one instance, he published a fabricated screenshot of a conversation with ChatGPT as “proof” that the “Trojka” coalition had a significantly lower approval rating than the SDA, claiming that the AI “could not hide the facts”. Additionally, he was responsible for the most viral distribution of a video from Nepal, which he falsely presented as a historic breakthrough of the blockade in Gaza by barehand heroes carrying aid on their backs.
Dževad Galijašević, frequently introduced in regional media as a “security expert”, is a prominent figure in pro-SNSD propaganda circles known for his inflammatory rhetoric regarding terrorism. He accused the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) of using its funds to support “political Islam,” parallel religious structures, and global terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and ISIS within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Galijašević also spread the mathematically impossible claim that the Federation of BiH received $625 million in USAID aid in just two years, attempting to paint the organization as a destabilizing force in the region.
Tactics and Techniques Used to Spread Disinformation
Throughout 2025, disinformation actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to rely on familiar tactics, while several patterns became more pronounced. Work done by Raskrinkavanje indicates both the persistence of established techniques and the adaptation to new technologies.
In November 2025, early elections for the President of Republika Srpska were held. During the campaign period, the country’s information space was again saturated with content produced and disseminated by anonymous online portals. Their reporting on elections goes against the Election Law of BiH. However, beyond merely covering the campaign, some of these outlets assumed an openly partisan role promoting particular candidates, while systematically discrediting others through unverified or manipulative claims.
Disinformation actors also sought to reinforce long-standing narratives concerning Milorad Dodik, the Dayton Peace Agreement and the Office of the High Representative. In 2025, these efforts increasingly included attempts to fabricate or exaggerate supposed support from the United States. The technique utilized included false and misleading claims alleging endorsement from “world media” or prominent American journalists circulated in order to lend external legitimacy to domestically generated narratives. Such content was designed to suggest international validation where none existed (1, 2).
The fabrication of statements attributed to political figures, identified in previous reports as a recurring tactic, remained widespread in 2025. These false quotations typically centered on sensitive political and social issues and were disseminated primarily via social media. Their objective was to damage the reputation of targeted individuals, deepen polarization and provoke public outrage. Raskrinkavanje documented and debunked multiple instances of this practice over the course of the year (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
In 2025, the use of generative artificial intelligence (AI) became an increasingly visible tactic in the production and amplification of disinformation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. AI-generated images and videos were repeatedly presented as authentic documentation of dramatic events, particularly in the context of wars, natural disasters and crises abroad. Fabricated visuals depicting fires, missile strikes or large-scale destruction were circulated on social media as real-time evidence, often accompanied by emotionally charged or politically instrumentalized captions. These practices demonstrate how advances in accessible generative tools make it simple and affordable to produce persuasive but false visual content, blur the line between authentic and synthetic material and increase the speed at which misleading narratives can spread (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).
Creating scams and fraudulent schemes on social media remained a persistent method of spreading disinformation and directly harming citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2025. As documented in previous SEE Check reports, scammers frequently relied on fabricated endorsements by well-known public figures from the country and the region to promote dubious products or suspicious investment platforms. Another widespread tactic involved fake prize giveaways designed to lure users into sharing personal or financial data (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
In 2025, such schemes increasingly relied on deceptive subscription models embedded behind seemingly harmless prize giveaways published on Facebook. Users were misled into entering their phone numbers under the pretext of participating in giveaways, only to discover that they had unknowingly activated paid digital services billed through their mobile operators. These campaigns combined misleading advertising, unclear consent mechanisms and the misuse of trusted brand identities, illustrating how disinformation techniques are often intertwined with financially motivated fraud in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s online space (1, 2).
During 2025, Raskrinkavanje also identified and uncovered a new type of scam appearing in our information space. This new tactic involved fraudulent humanitarian campaigns circulating on Facebook, which exploited emotionally charged images of sick children to solicit donations. These cases were based on the misuse of images, which were falsely presented as beneficiaries of urgent humanitarian appeals. The posts were designed to provoke strong emotional reactions and a sense of moral urgency, encouraging users to share the content widely and to donate money without verifying the authenticity of the campaigns.
In several instances, the same images were reused across multiple posts and pages, often accompanied by inconsistent or entirely false claims. In many cases, donation links redirected users to platforms lacking clear background, further raising concerns about the legitimacy of the fundraising efforts. This new tactic utilized in BiH clearly shows how scammers take advantage of public empathy and solidarity, particularly when the alleged beneficiaries are children, to generate financial contributions. These fraudulent campaigns represent a particularly harmful form of online deception, as they not only pose a direct financial risk to citizens but also undermine trust in legitimate humanitarian initiatives and organizations (1, 2).
Backlash against fact-checkers
In early 2025, after Donald Trump took office, Meta announced major changes regarding its Third Party Fact-Checking Program (TPFC), including plans to phase it out in the United States and shift toward looser content moderation. This move by Meta, announced by its CEO Mark Zuckerberg himself, sparked a pronounced backlash against fact-checkers globally, with Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Western Balkans being no different. Meta’s leadership framed the move as a defensive measure to safeguard “free speech,” portraying fact-checking as ideologically biased and censorial. Fact-checkers rejected these claims, emphasizing that independent fact-checking adheres to strict standards of impartiality, transparency and accuracy and that the programme was never designed to remove content but rather to provide context and correct information to citizens. In BiH and the region, the announcement was seized upon by a range of actors who have long opposed independent fact-checking.
Political figures, pro-government tabloids, conspiracy theorists and fringe outlets celebrated the perceived “end of fact-checking”, interpreting Meta’s statements as confirmation of their narrative that fact-checkers are biased censors. These reactions were amplified by selective reporting that omitted key context, such as the fact that the TPFC changes would take place only in the US, fueling further misinformation about the state of fact-checking on Meta’s platforms in the region.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Meta’s announcement was quickly instrumentalized by actors who have long sought to delegitimize independent fact-checking. Several political commentators, partisan media outlets and social media users framed the company’s decision as proof that fact-checkers in the country had been “exposed” as biased or politically motivated. Some went as far as falsely claiming that fact-checking initiatives like Raskrinkavanje, would cease to operate or had already lost credibility and institutional support. These assertions were not grounded in fact but were used to reinforce pre-existing narratives portraying fact-checkers as foreign-funded censors acting against national interests.
This wave of harassment further contributed to a hostile environment for independent verification initiatives and underscored the vulnerability of fact-checkers to politically motivated pressure.
Events Instigating the Spread of Disinformation
As noted in previous reports, anniversaries and commemorations of events from the 1990s continued to act as recurring catalysts for disinformation in 2025. Marking sensitive historical moments, most notably the genocide in Srebrenica, regularly prompted a resurgence of denial, relativization and other forms of historical revisionism. Such narratives intensify around significant dates but also re-emerge throughout the year when current political developments revive public debate about the topics (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
The early elections in Republika Srpska likewise triggered a wave of misleading and manipulative content. Disinformation narratives focused not only on candidates, but also on the constitutional framework established by the Dayton Peace Agreement and the role of the Office of the High Representative. False or distorted claims circulated about the reasons for calling the early elections, as well as about the integrity of the electoral process itself. Although the official campaign period was shorter than usual, a substantial volume of disinformation was recorded, extending beyond the formal campaign timeline (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
Major news events, both domestic and international, also acted as triggers. In the local context, the case of more than 30 children found in Brčko amid suspicions of human trafficking generated a surge of disinformation (1, 2). Globally, high-profile tragedies such as the killings at Bondi Beach were rapidly instrumentalized within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s online space, demonstrating how disinformation narratives easily cross borders and adapt (1, 2).
The deterioration of health and subsequent death of Pope Francis also prompted renewed circulation of previously debunked claims, alongside the emergence of new fabrications (1, 2, 3, 4). Similarly, the inauguration of Donald Trump generated a spike in translated and repurposed disinformation originating primarily from English-language sources. Although these narratives were produced outside the region, they gained notable traction domestically, focusing largely on his policies and executive actions (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
Finally, the escalation of tensions between Israel and Iran triggered a significant increase in misleading content within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s information environment. Alongside imported narratives, locally relevant disinformation circulated widely, with AI-generated images and videos playing a particularly prominent role in amplifying false or exaggerated claims (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
Antidisinformation Update
During 2025, Raskrinkavanje continued to strengthen its prebunking efforts, focusing on proactive responses to disinformation trends in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By identifying and explaining manipulative narratives before they reach peak visibility, these efforts aim to reduce their potential impact and equip citizens with tools to recognize misleading content. Throughout the year, prebunking articles addressed several recurring themes and tactics (1, 2, 3, 4).
Ahead of the early elections in Republika Srpska, Raskrinkavanje and Istinomjer implemented a joint, multi-format prebunking campaign. With a particular emphasis on engaging younger audiences, the initiative included a series of short-form videos designed for social media platforms. These videos unpacked prominent election-related disinformation narratives and explained common techniques used to influence the information environment (1, 2, 3, 4). In addition, the platforms introduced interactive quizzes focused on key electoral topics, encouraging users to test their knowledge and reflect on how easily manipulative claims can spread during politically sensitive periods (1, 2, 3).
Throughout 2025, advocating for stronger information integrity in the Western Balkans remained one of the core priorities of CA “Zašto ne”. The organization engaged with multiple stakeholders at both national and regional levels, including the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), national decision-makers, regulators, EU Delegations, CSOs and academics. These efforts helped raise awareness among regional stakeholders about the benefits of digital regulation and strengthened consensus on the need for a coordinated regional approach to alignment with the EU Digital Services Act (DSA).
By strengthening partnerships and deepening cooperation with EU-based organizations and networks, the organization created new avenues to engage in EU policy discussions and advocate for including Western Balkan priorities in policy debates related to digital regulation. In 2025, Zašto ne became an affiliate member of EDRi, a leading European digital rights network. The organization also joined the CSO coordination group on the European Democracy Shield, led by the European Partnership for Democracy, where it worked to raise awareness of Western Balkan perspectives in the group’s submissions to public consultations and proposals for amendments related to this initiative.
Several studies and analyses were published related to this topic, with contribution by Zašto ne:
- A study “Preparedness of Digital Environment Regulators for the Requirements of the DSA, DMA and AIA: Analysis of the Institutional Capacities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia”,
- “Principles for a Human Rights-Based Application of the DSA: A Global Perspective”, published by a global coalition of civil society organizations, researchers, and human rights advocates gathered within the DSA Human Rights Alliance, with direct participation of CA “Zašto ne”.
CA “Zašto ne” produced and participated in several other publications relevant to the topics of information integrity.
Maida Ćulahović and Tijana Cvjetićanin produced an analysis “Why Professional Fact-Checking Matters: Meta, the EU, and the Western Balkans”, published in September 2025.
CA “Zašto ne” in February 2025 published a publication “Integrity of information during the election campaign in the online space”.
In December 2025, CA “Zašto ne” produced a publication “Violation of users’ rights in the online environment and the responsibility of online platforms: Benefits of regulation and the role of non-state actors”.
Members of the CA “Zašto ne” participated in many regional and international events, bringing BiH’s perspective on issues related to disinformation, such as:
- Balkan Disinformation Summit in Prishtina,
- “Together for Truth: Whole-of-Society Approach to Safeguard Democracy” conference,
- EU-Western Balkans Media Literacy Conference in Skopje,
- Copenhagen Conference on Information Integrity,
- Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft annual conference in Leipzig.
Several events that were significant for the topics of the information environment took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2025.
“Point 13” conference organized by “Zašto ne” was held in Sarajevo on 29-30 May 2025. Apart from organizing the conference and curating the program, members of “Zašto ne” Tijana Cvjetićanin, Marija Ćosić, Maida Ćulahović, took active part in the panel discussions, both as speakers and moderators. Some of the topics addressed during the Point conference include gender disinformation, the whole-of-society approach to tackling disinformation, fact-checking in the MENA region and others.
Internet Governance Forum Bosnia and Herzegovina took place in Sarajevo in November 2025. CA “Zašto ne” co-organized and moderated two panels within this event – “Disinformation in the Balkan Media Space” and “Are We Ready to Regulate the Digital Environment: Institutional Capacities and Challenges of Aligning with EU”, with Emir Zulejhić and Maida Ćulahović from “Zašto ne” participating in them.
Legislation Overview
There have not been any legislation changes relevant for the information integrity imposed in BiH during 2025. However, during 2025 there were significant examples of implementation of previously adopted legislation changes.
As explained in the baseline report, in August 2023 the Criminal code of Republika Srpska was amended to make libel a criminal offense, despite protests of journalists and serious criticism from the media, civil society and other organizations.
As Radio Free Europe reported in January 2026, more than two hundred criminal charges were filed against citizens, activists and opposition figures, including 38 lawsuits against journalists. Journalist and editor of the Spin info website Sanja Vasković is one of the first journalists against whom a criminal charge for defamation was filed, and the prosecutor’s office never filed an indictment. According to data from the Capital website from June 2025, only one indictment was filed in Banja Luka, and the Direkt portal reported that one indictment was later filed in Trebinje. According to media reports, journalist Milanka Kovačević holds the record for the number of charges received – as many as 6 criminal charges for defamation were filed against her.
As explained in the 2024 country report, in March 2024 the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina introduced amendments to the Election Law. Among these changes was a revision of Article 16.1. which now requires online media outlets “that choose to report on the election campaign” to provide public and transparent information about their ownership. The imposed amendments to the Election Law also prohibit political entities from spreading false information through the media that could undermine the integrity of the electoral process and mislead voters. The Central Election Commission (CEC) BiH has been authorized to act in cases of such violations.
As explained in the section regarding the TTP’s above, the anonymous websites continued to serve as channels for voter manipulation and candidates favorization, thus avoiding the Election Law implementation.
On the other hand, the Central Election Commission for the first time implemented the changes of the Election Law regarding the spread of disinformation by political actors. When the team of “Zašto ne” had a meeting with CEC after the 2024 elections, members of the commission said that they were not responsible for all of election-related disinformation, but only the cases that target CEC and election process itself. It is not clear how CEC made that decision, since the Election Law does not prescribe such a limitation, even if it is not as clear as it should be when regulating this issue. For example, it does not describe what disinformation is and how it needs to be proved.
However, during the early elections in RS, three disinformation cases were initiated against the three political parties. The SDS and the List for Law and Order Nebojša Vukanović were fined 12.000KM each for saying that the President of the Central Election Commission is biased since his wife supposedly worked as an advisor to SNSD candidate Siniša Karan while he was Minister of Internal Affairs. The decision itself (sent to media by Vukanović and not published by CEC) does not fully clarify which part of the sanctioned statements is considered disinformation – whether the decision refers to the allegations of “the work engagement of a close family member of the President of the Central Election Commission”; to the allegations of his bias and conflict of interest; or to both. The confusion is all the greater because the claim itself is called defamation in some places, while in others it is refuted with arguments that the work engagement of a family member of the President of the Central Election Commission “cannot automatically be a reason for his biased actions.” Therefore, for the claim itself about the engagement of the wife of the President of the Commission, no evidence was presented to show whether it was incorrect and in what part, nor did the Central Election Commission refer to any other source that established these facts. As for the allegations of bias and conflict of interest, it is questionable whether they can be assessed in this way at all, because in the first case it is a subjective impression of the person speaking, and in the second case it is a legal category for the determination of which there are parameters and procedures to which this decision, however, does not refer. SNSD, on the other hand, was fined 15.000KM because Milorad Dodik spread disinformation during the election period. As stated at the session of the CEC BiH, it was reported in the media and websites that Dodik had told a series of lies about the members of the CEC and the Commission itself as an institution. This decision was also not published publicly, and while SNSD have not provided media with it, it is even more unclear to which specific claims the fine referred to, as well as how they were augmented.
All these questions, once again, show how highly problematic the very idea of legally sanctioning disinformation is, firstly because an incorrect claim is treated as something that is an offense. Secondly, and more importantly – even if the law is clear about the fact-finding procedure and disinformation definition, it is very problematic to treat factual claims as a matter on which state institutions can decide in this way, because sanctioning speech can easily turn into an instrument of censorship and endangering freedom of thought, expression and media freedoms. Especially in cases like this in which one person (or institution) is a prosecutor, a judge, as well as a target of disinformation. Simply put – establishing facts and exposing disinformation must not be a lever for punishing speech that politically bothers someone or threatens personal or party interests.
(Marija Ćosić and Emir Zulejhić, Raskrinkavanje.ba)
