By: Maida Salkanović
The Biden administration has allocated $18 million from the budget for juggling courses to rehabilitate Ukrainian soldiers. Ukrainian soldiers are being dismantled for pieces and sent to Poland to be organ donors. Sixty-nine percent of the members of the parties elected this year in Germany are involved in pedophile scandals in one form or another.
What do all these claims have in common? They are false claims that are part of Operation Overload, a tactical and coordinated disinformation effort that has been ongoing for at least 1.5 years. Although the operation continues, its impact on fact-checkers, particularly in Southeast Europe, has significantly diminished due to increased awareness and improved digital security practices.
A Tweet linked in one of the emails.
Unpacking Operation Overload
In June 2024, Finnish organization CheckFirst, in collaboration with Reset.tech, published a detailed report exposing a “large-scale disinformation campaign targeting journalists and fact-checkers, feeding them fake content aligned with a pro-Russian agenda,” as described by the International Press Institute (IPI). The operation involves the creation and distribution of fabricated assets, such as images, videos, and screenshots, crafted to appear credible and relevant to the news cycle. This content is disseminated through various channels, including emails, Telegram, and X (formerly Twitter).
Operation Overload is designed to overwhelm fact-checkers, newsrooms, and researchers worldwide, draining their resources while manipulating trusted information networks to advance the Kremlin’s political agenda. It achieves this through a coordinated email campaign, interconnected networks of Telegram channels, fake accounts on X, and a network of Russia-aligned websites.
At the core of the operation is a tactic known as “content amalgamation,” which combines different types of content to create layered, persuasive narratives. These narratives are then strategically amplified across multiple platforms, creating a false sense of urgency that pressures journalists and fact-checkers to respond. The campaign also employs tactics such as impersonating credible Western media and public figures and tying false narratives to real events to make them appear more believable.
Impact on Fact-Checkers in Southeast Europe
Fact-checkers in Southeast Europe were not spared. The oldest emails CheckFirst found date back to August 2023, marking the beginning of the campaign’s activity. This was around the same time Croatian fact-checker Faktograf first noticed suspicious tags on X from profiles spreading fake news aligned with pro-Russian propaganda. These were soon followed by emails designed to manipulate fact-checkers into verifying false stories.
“At first, with the first few emails, we even thought they were legitimate inquiries,” explained Jordi Ilić from Faktograf. “Until suspicious attachments and links to Telegram groups started appearing.” The manipulation was subtle at first, crafted to seem like genuine requests for fact-checking, which made it difficult to immediately identify the malicious intent behind them.
In Montenegro, Darvin Murić from Raskrinkavanje recounted a similar experience, noting that they began receiving emails around a year ago, with a significant increase in frequency mid-last year. “Each click in vain and every wasted minute could have been spent much more productively,” Murić reflected. Although the emails did not disrupt the newsroom’s overall functioning, the constant demand to verify dubious content drained valuable resources.
The experience was similar in Serbia. Vesna Radojević from Raskrikavanje observed that the emails followed a repetitive and bot-like structure. “The language of these emails is very similar, always with strong words like ‘scandal,’ ‘involved in crime,’ ‘breaking news,’ ‘shock.’ There are always photos attached, and the body of the email is filled with links,” she said, describing the messages as “a pretty stereotypical bot job.” The emails always came in English, a clear indicator that they were not regionally targeted but part of a coordinated international effort against fact-checkers.
The campaign initially focused on the war in Ukraine but quickly broadened its scope to cover major international events and political developments. “In the beginning, it was about the war in Ukraine, but at some point, we started receiving emails on the US elections, the Paris Olympics, and other unrelated topics,” noted Ilić.
Currently, many of the emails target USAID, with narratives claiming that USAID is “losing $20 billion after control over Ukrainian biolabs in 2022,” a twist on the widespread conspiracy theory about Ukrainian biolabs, often used as a justification for Russian invasion. Another email falsely alleged that “the Vatican’s meeting with the widows of Azov Regiment soldiers was manipulated by USAID representatives.” A third claim stated, “USAID’s collaboration with Google to promote pro-Ukrainian content on YouTube cost about $8-12 billion,” suggesting a politically motivated agenda to influence public opinion. These narratives resonate with the current political climate in the US and are strategically aimed at discrediting USAID.
An email sent to Raskrikavanje
Why the Campaign Lost Its Impact
Despite its ongoing nature, the impact of Operation Overload on fact-checkers has significantly waned. The European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) emphasized the importance of collaborative work among fact-checkers, as many were able to identify the emails as spam and contributed valuable examples to CheckFirst and Reset.
“Communication among us is the best solution, and it has proven effective. Very quickly, the fact-checking community within the system warned about these campaigns and potential implications,” said Radojević, adding that “cooperation and regular information sharing are key.” This interconnectedness among fact-checkers enabled them to build a collective digital immunity against the barrage of disinformation, reducing its overall impact.
Enhanced digital literacy and security practices also played a crucial role. Fact-checkers became more adept at recognizing and ignoring the emails, minimizing time wasted on debunking false claims. This was coupled with a concerted effort to educate younger team members about digital safety. “After communication and collaboration, the next step is digital security training for younger team members,” said Radojević.
The increased awareness of digital threats also contributed to the campaign’s reduced effectiveness. “As long as we maintain our digital security, I don’t think there’s much danger to us,” Radojević stated. However, she also highlighted the potential risks, warning that “what can be quite dangerous here is that we can receive these harmless emails for months, think they’re just ordinary links, and then be deceived and click—only to discover that it was actually a cyber-attack, possibly involving spyware or a virus.”
Ilić also emphasized the broader implications of Operation Overload, noting that “this is potentially harmful because it targets not only fact-checkers but also other newsrooms and journalists who may not realize they are dealing with information manipulation.” She went on to suggest that this could be seen as a form of “cyber warfare.”
Lessons Learned and Future Implications
Operation Overload reveals a coordinated campaign aimed at overwhelming fact-checkers, newsrooms, and researchers worldwide. By draining their resources and manipulating trusted information networks, the operation seeks to advance the Kremlin’s political agenda. Despite its ongoing nature, the campaign’s diminished impact on Southeast European fact-checkers demonstrates the effectiveness of digital resilience, international collaboration, and heightened security awareness.
However, the operation’s continuous evolution suggests that vigilance remains essential. By staying connected and informed, the fact-checking community is better equipped to combat evolving disinformation tactics and protect the integrity of public discourse.
