Original article (in Bosnian) was published on 3/10/2025; Author: Nerma Šehović
The recent incursions of Russian drones and aircraft into Polish and Estonian airspace have been “justified” in pro-Russian media as operations meant to drag these countries into conflict with Russia, accompanied by casual comparisons to the “staged” massacres at Sarajevo’s Markale market.
During the night of September 9 to September 10, 2025, the Polish army shot down several drones that violated its airspace, claiming they were Russian. The incursion occurred amid Russian military activity in Ukraine near the Polish border. Viewing the drones as a threat, Poland downed them with fighter jets. The incursion was declared an act of aggression and invoked Article 4 of the NATO Charter, which provides for consultations between allies when one’s security is threatened. A few days later, on September 19, Estonian authorities claimed that three Russian MiG-31 aircraft had entered the country’s airspace and remained there for 12 minutes.
Russia denied that its aircraft had violated foreign airspace in both the Polish and Estonian cases.
Soon after, social media and some media outlets began spreading claims that these were “false flag” attacks, a term referring to an operation carried out in such a way as to make it appear that the opposing side is responsible.
On September 25, 2025, the regional branch of the Russian state media outlet Sputnik published an article titled “Drones Like Markale: Will Poland Also Go to War With Russia?” The article quoted historian Goran Miloradović and stated:
The story about the alleged fall of Russian drones in Poland and MiGs entering Estonian airspace is a false-flag operation, similar to Markale and Vase Miskina Street during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the ‘90s, organized either by Ukraine or by those in Europe who want to prolong the war with Russia, according to Sputnik’s interlocutor.
Such incidents, historian Dr. Goran Miloradović from the Institute for Contemporary History believes, primarily benefit the Ukrainian authorities, as Ukraine cannot afford to be left alone against Russia and must drag, if not the entire EU and NATO, then at least one or two countries into the conflict.
After these incidents, a translated clip of former U.S. lieutenant Douglas Macgregor’s interview went viral on Facebook, also claiming that the attacks in Poland and Estonia were “false flag” operations. As supposed evidence, Macgregor said Swedish and Polish SIM cards had been found in the downed drones in Poland.
We found similar “false flag” claims on other Facebook profiles as well.
What Do We Know About the Airspace Incursions Into NATO Countries?
Neither Goran Miloradović nor Douglas Macgregor presented any concrete evidence to support their claims of “false flag” operations, apart from Macgregor’s reference to the SIM cards allegedly found in the Polish drones. On the other hand, available information strongly suggests that the drones that entered Polish airspace were indeed Russian.
These were Gerbera drones of Russian manufacture. Of the 19 drones that entered Polish airspace on September 10, some came from Belarus. At the time, a Russian attack was underway on the Ukrainian side of the border (link).
What remains under debate among NATO members is whether the incursion was accidental or intentional. As CNN reported on September 19, 2025 in an article, sources in Ukraine and Poland claim it was a deliberate act meant to test Polish air defenses. Meanwhile, several intelligence sources cited by CNN said that, based on the information they had, it was more likely that the drones had strayed off course while searching for GPS signals, and that Ukrainian electronic interference during the Russian attack may have caused the deviation.
According to some media reports, Polish and Lithuanian SIM cards were indeed found in the drones heading toward Poland. However, it is well known that Russia has long used 4G modems with SIM cards in drones to transmit intelligence data. In July of this year, drones shot down in Ukraine contained Polish and Lithuanian SIM cards, which many analysts interpreted as a sign that Russia was planning drone incursions into these countries—using SIM connectivity for navigation (1, 2). These SIM cards, therefore, are not evidence of a “false flag” attack but rather suggest that the incursion was intentional.
It is also important to note that the September 10 incident was not the first time Russian drones entered Polish territory in the past few months. In addition to Poland, flights of Russian and unidentified drones have been recorded in other countries including Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Denmark, Norway, France, and Germany.
Incidents with “stray” aircraft have been occurring across Europe since the start of the war in Ukraine, including the Balkan region.
As for the fighter jets that Estonia claims violated its airspace, Russia did not deny the flight but stated that the aircraft did not actually enter Estonian territory.
All in all, there is no concrete evidence of any conspiracy to fabricate Russian airspace incursions in order to draw NATO countries directly into the conflict.
Denial of War Crimes in B&H in Pro-Russian Propaganda
In the absence of real evidence that the incidents in Poland and Estonia were “false flag” operations, Goran Miloradović resorted to decades-old propaganda narratives claiming that the massacres of civilians in Sarajevo during the Bosnian War were staged. These include the massacres at the Markale market in 1994 and 1995 and the massacre in Vase Miskina Street (today’s Ferhadija) in 1992.
The Vase Miskina Street massacre occurred on May 27, 1992, while civilians were waiting in line for bread. Three mortar shells were fired into the street, killing 26 and injuring 136 people. No one was directly convicted for this crime, but it is referenced in the judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) against Ratko Mladić, general of the Army of Republika Srpska, who was sentenced to life imprisonment for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. As stated in the judgment (p. 1.115), it was proven that the shells were fired from Trebević, from positions controlled by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (SRK).
The first Markale market massacre took place on February 5, 1994, killing 68 and wounding more than 140 people. The facts about this crime were established in ICTY verdicts against former Republika Srpska president Radovan Karadžić and Sarajevo-Romanija Corps commander Stanislav Galić.
The second massacre occurred on August 28, 1995, killing 43 and injuring more than 80 people. The facts of this crime were confirmed in the verdicts against Radovan Karadžić and SRK commander Dragomir Milošević.
Based on material evidence from multiple investigations and numerous witness testimonies, the International Criminal Tribunal concluded in both cases that the shells fired at Markale came from positions held by the Army of Republika Srpska. More details on the court-presented evidence are available in Raskrinkavanje’s analysis here.
Despite these verdicts and the clear evidence of responsibility for the Markale and Ferhadija massacres, denial persists even decades later. In recent years, especially around anniversaries, disinformation campaigns have emerged spreading absurd conspiracy theories about these events being “staged” or “fabricated” (link).
Since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Russian and pro-Russian media in the region have used this revisionist narrative to discredit allegations of Russian war crimes, even creating the term “Ukrainian Markale” as early as 2022. It has been invoked almost every time news emerges from Ukraine about civilian killings.
According to the facts, we rate the claim that Russian air incursions into Poland and Estonia were “false flag” attacks as conspiracy theory. The claim that the massacres at the Markale market and in Vase Miskina Street in Sarajevo were staged to blame the Army of Republika Srpska are rated as spreading fake news and conspiracy theory.
